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APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO
GUANTANAMO BAY
GUANTANAMO AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
RASUL AND BEYOND
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III

†

Of the legal issues raised by the Bush Administration’s conduct of
the war on terror, the detention of alleged “enemy combatants” presents perhaps the starkest conflict between individual liberty and executive authority. The Executive has claimed the power to designate
individuals as enemy combatants and thereafter to hold them indefinitely without judicial review or access to counsel. A triad of cases decided by the Supreme Court in its October 2003 Term put this claim
1
to the test and generally rejected it.
Two cases dealt with Americans confined in the Navy brig in
Charleston, South Carolina. Yaser Hamdi, allegedly captured on the
field of battle in Afghanistan, was held entitled as a matter of Fifth
Amendment Due Process to “a meaningful opportunity to contest the
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker,” and
2
to the assistance of counsel in that proceeding. The claims of Jose
Padilla, arrested in Chicago and detained initially in New York before
transport to the Charleston brig, received a slightly less welcoming reception: over the dissent of four Justices, the Court held that his habeas petition was improperly filed in the Southern District of New
3
York and ordered its dismissal. Padilla will, however, be able to take
advantage of the same rights as Hamdi upon refiling in South Carolina.
No such confident prediction can be made with respect to the further proceedings contemplated by the Court’s opinion in the third
†

Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank Gerald Neuman, Catherine Struve, and the participants at a Penn faculty workshop for helpful
comments. John Maselli provided able research assistance.
1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
2
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635, 2652.
3
See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2727.
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4

case, Rasul v. Bush. There, the Justices affirmed that citizens of
friendly countries confined in the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay
5
could challenge their detention by filing habeas petitions. Petitioners’ counsel urged the Court to resolve only this preliminary question,
6
and the Court accepted the invitation. The result was a decision that
rejected the Executive’s claim to complete freedom from judicial scrutiny but left unclear precisely what rights the petitioners have that
7
might be vindicated by a habeas petition.
Rasul is thus a victory for the rule of law, but one whose magnitude has yet to be determined. My aim in this Article is to offer some
speculation about the question the Court left unanswered, and in particular to do so from the perspective of conflict of laws. The Court has
not always understood extraterritorial application of American law to
present a conflicts issue, but I hope to show that taking this perspective will allow us a clearer understanding of that difficult question.
Equally important, bringing conflicts theory to bear on extraterritoriality will reflect light back on the theory, offering some lessons that
can be applied to conflicts more generally.
Part I of the Article discusses the Rasul decision in detail, considering it in the context of both the other detention cases and the
Court’s most recent decisions about the extraterritorial scope of
American law. It concludes that Rasul is most plausibly read to imply
8
that the Constitution extends rights to the Guantanamo detainees.
Part II describes the reasons why this extension is surprising; it traces

4

124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
6
See Brief for Petitioners at 20, Rasul (No. 03-334), available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/334Pet.pdf (suggesting that
the analysis of what due process rights petitioners may invoke “can wait for another
day”); Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (“What is presently at stake is only whether the federal
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”).
7
As I will argue later, the most sensible reading of Rasul would take it to imply
that the Guantanamo detainees have some form of due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. The aim of this Article,
however, is not to tease out implications from the Court’s opinion but rather to consider the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution as a more general matter, and in
particular as a problem in the conflict of laws.
8
Surprisingly, the Executive still seems intent upon arguing that the detainees
have no constitutional rights at all, asserting that “[a]s aliens detained by the military
outside the sovereign territory of the United States and lacking a sufficient connection
to the country, petitioners have no cognizable constitutional rights.” See Neil A. Lewis,
New Fight on Guantánamo Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at A18 (quoting the Executive’s district court filing in Rasul on remand).
5
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the development of the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence, from
the early territorialist dogma to the more recent expansions. Part III
turns from doctrine to theory, exploring the various arguments for
and against extraterritoriality immanent in the case law and urged by
scholars. It asserts that these theories have less resolving power than is
commonly supposed; most, in fact, beg the question. Part IV explicitly
invokes the methodology of conflicts. Though this methodology does
not give a clear answer either, its application does frame the question
in a more analytically tractable manner. This Part also argues that the
exercise of applying conflicts methodology sheds some light on conflicts itself; having reformed our approach to conflicts in response, we
are left in a better position to tackle the question of the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution. Part V returns to the case of Guantanamo, applying the methodology derived in the preceding part to
the Due Process Clause.
I. EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
IN OT 2003
The Rasul petitioners are two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan and subsequently transferred to
Guantanamo Bay, where they were confined without charges or access
9
to counsel. According to their petitions, all were engaged in innocent conduct such as providing humanitarian aid, visiting relatives, or
10
arranging marriage. They were arrested by various local authorities
and turned over to U.S. forces, in some cases in exchange for boun11
ties. Through various next friends, they sought to invoke federal jurisdiction to review the legality of their confinement.
The district court dismissed the petitions for lack of subject matter
12
jurisdiction, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Like the district court,
13
the D.C. Circuit relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager, in which the Supreme Court rejected the habeas petitions of German nationals con9

Two British citizens, Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, were among the petitioners at
the district court and court of appeals stages of the litigation but were released prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1. Other Guantanamo
detainees were initially arrested in other countries, including Bosnia, Zambia, and
Gambia. See David Rose, Guantánamo Bay on Trial, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 88, 133
(describing the nationalities and places of arrest of the Guantanamo detainees).
10
See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
11
See id.
12
See Al Odah v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (mem.), aff’d,
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
13
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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fined in the Landsberg prison in Germany following convictions by
14
The D.C. Circuit read Eisentrager, as
military tribunals in China.
glossed by later Supreme Court decisions, to establish that the U.S.
Constitution offered aliens abroad no protection against the U.S. gov15
ernment. If the Constitution gave such people no rights, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned, “[w]e cannot see why, or how, the writ [of habeas
16
corpus] may be made available.”
Given the initial premise that the Constitution is territorial in
scope, at least as to aliens, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning makes some
sense. To permit the filing of a habeas petition alleging violations of
constitutional rights when the court has already determined that the
petitioner has no constitutional rights that could be violated is a cha17
rade at best pointless, and more likely cruel. The most surprising
feature of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, then, may be that
the Court found a way to reverse the D.C. Circuit without contesting
18
the territorialist premise. Understanding how the Court managed to
do so requires a bit of a detour into pre- and post-Eisentrager habeas
jurisprudence, as well as a more thorough discussion of Eisentrager itself.

14

Id. at 790-91.
See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141 (discussing Eisentrager, United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
16
Id.
17
The reasoning makes only some sense, though, because such petitioners might
still be able to identify rights under “the laws or treaties of the United States,” the
other elements of the habeas trinity. See 28 U.S.C. 2241(a), (c)(3) (2004) (authorizing
district courts to hear habeas petitions by those allegedly “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”). To deal with that possibility, the
D.C. Circuit invoked an alternate formulation of the Eisentrager holding, that the petitioners lacked “the privilege of litigation” in U.S. courts. See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1144
(quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78). On this point, however, it seems quite likely
that the dispositive factor in Eisentrager was the petitioners’ status as nonresident enemy
aliens. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776 (“[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one
who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even [a] qualified access
to our courts . . . .”). The Rasul petitioners are nonresident alien friends. See Al-Odah,
321 F.3d at 1139-40. Such people certainly can litigate in U.S. courts, and it is hard to
see why the mere fact of military custody (which the D.C. Circuit found dispositive)
should deprive them of that privilege. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (“The fact that petitioners in these cases are being held in military custody is immaterial to the question of
the District Court’s jurisdiction over their nonhabeas statutory claims.”). As my concern here is the extraterritorial application of the Constitution, I will not address this
issue further.
18
As I will explain later, I believe the reversal cannot be read as carrying anything
less than a strong hint that the petitioners do possess substantive constitutional rights.
See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
15
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A. Eisentrager, Ahrens, and Braden
Eisentrager, the Rasul majority observed, was decided under the re19
gime of Ahrens v. Clarke. The habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, then
(as now) authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus
20
“within their respective jurisdictions.” Ahrens interpreted this language to require, as a jurisdictional matter, that a habeas petitioner
21
applying to a district court be confined within that district. Thus,
district courts under the Ahrens regime had the power to issue writs of
habeas corpus at the application only of petitioners confined within
their district. Correlatively, prisoners could file petitions only with the
district court within whose district they were confined. What this
meant for prisoners confined outside the borders of any federal judi22
cial district, the Ahrens Court declined to decide, though (as the dissent pointed out) if the limitation were truly jurisdictional, no special
23
circumstances could remedy the absence of judicial power. Such
people would have no means of seeking habeas relief, regardless of
the legality of their confinement.
This categorical restriction on the availability of habeas relief
24
would seem to raise serious questions under the Suspension Clause,
and it was that constitutional doubt that drove the D.C. Circuit’s
analysis in Eisentrager. The D.C. Circuit (in an interesting counterpoint to its approach in Al Odah) started with the premise that “constitutional prohibitions apply directly to acts of Government, or Government officials, and are not conditioned upon persons or
25
territory.” In consequence, “any person who is deprived of his liberty
by officials of the United States, acting under purported authority of
19

335 U.S. 188 (1948).
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2004).
21
See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190 (“It is not sufficient in our view that the jailer or custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction.”).
22
See id. at 192 n.4.
23
See id. at 209 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[I]f absence of the body detained from
the territorial jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the jailer creates a total
and irremediable void in the court’s capacity to act . . . then it is hard to see how that
gap can be filled . . . .”); Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following
the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587, 632 (1949) (“But if the statute makes the presence of the
petitioner a requisite to jurisdiction, how can it make any difference whether the detention is in no district rather than in a different district?”).
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it.”).
25
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 763
(1950).
20
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26

that Government,” could invoke due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment, and the right to habeas corpus as a means of vindicating
those rights could not be defeated “by an omission in a federal juris27
dictional statute.”
While apparently conceding that the habeas statute, as interpreted
in Ahrens, contained just such an omission, the D.C. Circuit also stated
that the statute must be construed to make habeas jurisdiction “coextensive with executive power, at least in so far as prisoners in jail are
28
concerned.” Finding statutory jurisdiction present “by compulsion
of the Constitution itself,” the D.C. Circuit directed the district court
29
to resolve the merits of the petitions.
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion striking for its lack of
clarity. The Court noted what it took to be the salient facts about Eisentrager’s status:
[Eisentrager] (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all
30
times imprisoned outside the United States.

Without explaining the precise significance of these factors to its
various lines of reasoning, the Court then went on to suggest that the
petitioners (a) simply lacked standing to litigate in U.S. courts, regard31
less of what substantive rights they might have; (b) possessed no Fifth
32
Amendment rights; and (c) had failed to state a claim on the mer33
its. With respect to the question of the scope of the habeas statute,
the Court made only a few dismissive remarks. It noted that nothing
“in our statutes” conferred upon petitioners a right to the habeas writ,
and it observed that as the petitioners had failed to present a “basis for
invoking federal judicial power in any district,” there was no need to
decide where, if anywhere, they might have filed had they been able to
34
demonstrate such a basis.

26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 963.
Id. at 965.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 966, 968.
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).
See id. at 776-77.
See id. at 782-85.
See id. at 785-90.
See id. at 768, 790-91.
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The cursory treatment is understandable, given the multitude of
different justifications for the Court’s decision. If the petitioners
lacked Fifth Amendment rights, application of the rule of Ahrens
would pose no constitutional problems; if they lacked standing, the
rule would not even need to be applied.
The Eisentrager Court did not need to confront the possible anomaly created by Ahrens: the case of a habeas petitioner unlawfully confined beyond the bounds of any federal district. Subsequent cases,
dealing with Americans confined abroad, did, and found habeas jurisdiction without discussion, in apparent derogation of Ahrens’s juris35
dictional rule. The practical erosion of Ahrens was recognized in
36
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, which explicitly rejected Ahrens
and converted what had been an “inflexible jurisdictional rule” into
37
an endorsement of “traditional principles of venue.”
B. Rasul Revisited
With the Ahrens rule out of the way, it became possible to argue
that the habeas statute, by its plain text, allowed the Rasul petitioners
to seek habeas relief. And that argument is the one the Court accepted. Petitioners alleged confinement was “in violation of the
[Constitution and] laws of the United States,” and the statute “re38
quires nothing more.”
Finding habeas jurisdiction under the statute was undoubtedly an
appealing resolution for the Justices in the majority. It allowed the
Court to reject the Executive’s claim of unreviewable authority without taking any more dramatic steps, such as explicitly reversing Eisentrager or announcing that the Guantanamo detainees possessed consti39
tutional rights. Moreover, the petitioners, exercising good strategic

35

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (reaching merits of habeas petition filed by prisoner in Korea); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953)
(same for prisoners in Guam).
36
410 U.S. 484 (1973).
37
Id. at 500; see also Moore v. Olsen, 368 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]fter
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, which overruled Ahrens, the location of a collateral
attack is best understood as a matter of venue . . . .” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 125
S Ct. 362 (2004).
38
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
39
Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued with customary verve that the majority was hiding its “irresponsible overturning of settled law” behind Braden, which could not be
read to undercut Eisentrager’s statutory analysis because it “did not so much as mention Eisentrager.” Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But it is not at all surprising that a
decision rejecting by name the leading case for a particular reading of the habeas stat-
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judgment, had sought no more. All the same, it makes the opinion
40
somewhat less than fully satisfying.
What the Court did, essentially, was to decide that the petitioners
fell within the scope of the habeas statute: they were among the people entitled to invoke it. It is at this point that conflicts rears its ugly
head, for the question of who among the marginal cases may claim
the benefit of a particular law is one of the two quintessential conflicts
41
questions. An answer based purely on the text of a statute is unlikely
to be compelling, and may not even be sensible, for it is one of the
constant refrains of conflicts scholars that legislatures typically do not
specify either the scope of their statutes or the class of persons who
42
may invoke them. Indeed, failure to do so is precisely what necessitates conflicts analysis.
43
The Court did not perform anything resembling that analysis.
Apart from the text of the statute, it invoked the presumption against
extraterritoriality—a guide to statutory construction that itself ignores
44
modern conflicts learning —and then only to dismiss it. The pre-

ute would not mention subsequent cases relying upon the rejected decision. Eisentrager, of course, does mention Ahrens, see 339 U.S. at 767, 778, 790; and a rejection of
Ahrens (something implicitly achieved by 1955, see cases cited supra note 35) therefore
casts doubt on Eisentrager’s statutory interpretation.
40
By this I mean no criticism of the majority; opinion writers have other things on
their minds than pleasing the academic palate. Indeed, as I will suggest, I believe the
opinion should be understood to go a bit farther than it explicitly states.
41
At least according to what I and others have urged is the most useful understanding of conflicts analysis. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 291 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking] (“In [conflicts] cases,
the court’s task is to interpret the laws to determine whether either confers a right to
recover on the facts alleged in the particular case.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of
Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2467 (1999) [hereinafter
Roosevelt, Myth] (“[W]hether the plaintiff has a right at all . . . . is a question of the
scope of the right the plaintiff invokes—whether the law he appeals to grants rights to
people in his situation.”). The other question is how to handle conflicts between
rights.
42
See, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 293 (“[T]he great majority of laws
are silent with respect to extraterritorial reach . . . .”). Thus, the Court’s assertion that
the lack of a textual “distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal custody” means that “there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship,” Rasul, 124
S. Ct. at 2696, is less than fully convincing.
43
Although I do believe that the scope of the habeas statute, like the scope of the
Constitution, presents a conflicts question, I will also argue that many approaches to
conflicts are unhelpful in resolving the question. See infra Parts IV.A-B. I will argue
further that their lack of utility suggests something about what conflicts analysis should
look like. See infra Part IV.C.
44
See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of American Law,
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sumption against extraterritoriality, the Court stated, “certainly has no
application to . . . persons detained within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’
45
of the United States.”
How, then, can the scope of the right to habeas be sensibly determined? Modern conflicts theory, at least that part which follows
Brainerd Currie, would suggest that questions of extraterritorial application should be resolved by considering the purpose of the stat46
ute. A not-implausible characterization of the purpose of habeas
would be to allow petitioners to vindicate federal, notably constitu47
tional, rights. That purpose will, potentially, be implicated whenever
a petition is filed by a federal rights-holder. Thus, a plausible method
of deciding whether a particular person should be entitled to file a

1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 (1992) [hereinafter Kramer, Vestiges] (faulting the Court
for “thoughtlessly attempt[ing] to revive the original principle” of territoriality rather
than “learning from the diversity of views that [have] emerged”).
45
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
46
See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 367
(1963) (suggesting that a court should “ascertain” the government policy “as it has
been expressed in statutes and judicial decisions”); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at
213 (“The basic premise . . . is that the court should determine what policy a law was
enacted to achieve . . . .”).
47
The Rasul petitioners asserted rights not only under the Constitution, but under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000), international
law, and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1137
(detailing claims). The meat of the complaints, however, seems constitutional. The
Alien Tort Statute does not create any substantive rights but merely grants federal
courts jurisdiction to hear certain claims under international law. See Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755 (2004). The Administrative Procedure Act claims relied at least in part on alleged constitutional violations. See Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58
(“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct constitutes arbitrary, unlawful, and unconstitutional behavior in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”). Customary
international law is considered by many scholars to have the status of federal common
law. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 301-02 (1995) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963), for the proposition that customary international law must
be part of federal law); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1835 (1998) (“[E]ven after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain
legitimate authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into
federal common law.”). But the issue is controversial within the academy, compare Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (arguing that customary international law is not a part of federal law in the absence of “political branch
authorization”), with Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376
(1997) (“[S]uch rules [of customary international law] are presumptively incorporated
into the U.S. domestic legal system and given effect as rules of federal law.”), and unsettled in the courts. Consequently, I will focus on the constitutional rights at stake.
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habeas petition would be to ask whether that person alleges facts suggesting the possession of relevant federal rights. Extending the right
to seek habeas to people who have no rights to vindicate is, as the D.C.
48
Circuit observed in Al Odah, senseless; it is hard to imagine that the
drafters of the habeas statute would have approved such a result had
they considered it.
The scope of habeas jurisdiction, then, may plausibly be deemed
coextensive with the scope of substantive federal rights—in this case,
49
constitutional rights. That conclusion—embraced, in different ways,
by the D.C. Circuit opinions in Eisentrager and Al Odah, and implicitly
endorsed by the Supreme Court decisions reaching the merits of habeas petitions filed by Americans confined abroad—entangles the
question of statutory jurisdiction with at least the preliminary merits of
the constitutional claims. The prospect must have held little appeal
for the cautious Rasul majority, but it is, I think, what understanding
Rasul as a conflicts problem should suggest.
And that is one point that the conflicts perspective allows us to
make: the scope of habeas jurisdiction may be hard to sever from the
scope of the underlying substantive rights that habeas is meant to protect. It is a point of which the Rasul Court seemed to be aware, for,
despite its claim to be deciding only the statutory issue, the Rasul majority’s opinion casts long shadows over the merits. Its dismissal of the
presumption against extraterritorial scope of statutory law in the context of Guantanamo suggests that a territorialist argument for restrict48

Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
Indeed, the text of the statute (granting courts authority to issue the writ to
prisoners “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)) would seem to place the violation on a par with
the custody. The Supreme Court has consistently treated the custody as a jurisdictional requirement, i.e., a limitation on the set of persons entitled to seek the writ. See,
e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 494 (1989). Whether it makes sense to treat custody as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a merits issue, is another question. Confusion of subject matter jurisdiction with merits is pervasive in the
extraterritoriality case law; when the Court finds a plaintiff not within the set of people
protected by a law by reason of geographical scope, it dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the more conventional resolution would be dismissal for failure
to state a claim. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). But see
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a
proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for
want of jurisdiction.”). The problem here appears to be the belief that the fact that a
law “does not apply” means something other than that it grants the plaintiff no rights.
See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1301, 1309 (1989) (“‘[C]hoosing’ [a law] is not a step that must be completed before
the court can reach the merits, and there is no reason to insist that the court ‘apply’
some jurisdiction’s law.”).
49
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50

ing constitutional rights may likewise be deemed inapplicable. More
suggestive still is Justice Kennedy’s observation in concurrence that
“[f]rom a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of Guantanamo
Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending
51
the ‘implied protection’ of the United States to it.” Last, the Court
drops a footnote that all-but-explicitly decides the issue: “Petitioners’
allegations . . . unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the
52
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”
These hints suggest that the future holds a relatively simple answer to the constitutional question the Rasul Court purported to leave
undecided. Ultimately, it seems likely that the Court will make clear
that the petitioners enjoy constitutional due process protections
53
akin—if not identical—to those accorded Hamdi.
Eisentrager will
have to be confronted at some point, but the Court’s verbatim recital

50

124 S. Ct. at 2696.
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)).
52
Id. at 2698 n.15 (majority opinion). In light of these strong hints, it is disappointing, though perhaps not surprising, that the Executive has continued to assert on
remand that petitioners possess no constitutional rights at all. See In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005).
53
In Hamdi’s case, the plurality settled on the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test,
which weighs the private interest at stake against the governmental interest, considering the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” and the “probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute safeguards.” See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). That is,
Hamdi directs courts reviewing the claims of detained U.S. citizens to adjust the process
provided so as to minimize the aggregate costs of erroneous deprivations (weighted
according to the private interest at stake) and burdens on the government (weighted
according to the significance of the governmental interest or function). Hamdi, 124 S.
Ct. at 2646. The interests at stake, one would think, are the individual’s interest in liberty and the government’s interest in efficacious prosecution of the war on terror.
Oddly, the Court asserted instead that “[o]n the other side of the scale are the weighty
and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought
with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.” Id. at
2647. But that is an interest that comes into play only if the goal is reducing the number of mistakes in the individual’s favor. Providing more process—as distinguished
from, for instance, imposing a higher burden of proof—should actually increase the
accuracy of the factfinding process rather than simply altering the distribution of errors. Thus, more process, while it will undoubtedly impose greater burdens on the
government, should not increase the number of enemy combatants erroneously released to rejoin the foe. Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283
(1990) (noting the connection between burden of proof and error distribution). Not,
that is, unless it is being compared to a system under which the Executive simply detains people at its pleasure, a system under which the risk of erroneous release would
indeed seem slight. Mathews does not, however, seem to start from a baseline of absolute Executive power.
51
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54

of Eisentrager’s “six critical facts” suggests a willingness to distinguish
it, most likely on the grounds suggested by Justice Kennedy: that formal sovereignty is not the touchstone for the “implied protection” of
55
the U.S. Constitution. Even if it is not considered the precise equivalent of U.S. sovereign territory, Guantanamo may be treated like the
Canal Zone in Panama or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands,
places under U.S. jurisdiction and control whose occupants have consistently been held to enjoy at least “fundamental” constitutional
56
rights.
If the Court takes this route, which strikes me as the most likely
sequel, the result will be significant in terms of allocating jurisdiction
57
between the military and civilian courts. It will be less relevant for
54

Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
56
The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental rights comes from
the Insular Cases, in particular Justice White’s analysis of the rights of persons in “unincorporated” territories (those not destined for statehood). See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 288-94 (1901) (White, J., concurring). See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (discussing Insular Cases); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL
LAW 85-89 (1996) (same). The analogy to the Canal Zone and trust territory was
urged upon the Second Circuit in the litigation over the rights of Haitian refugees detained in Guantanamo. See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law
Group at 17-21, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992)
(No. 92-6090), available at 1992 WL 12024989. The court expressed some sympathy
but did not resolve the issue, and its decision was ultimately vacated on mootness
grounds. See Haitian Ctrs. Council, 969 F.2d at 1342-44, vacated sub nom. Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918, 918 (1993). The Rasul petitioners, presenting only a
statutory claim, did not make this argument but are certain to do so on remand. See
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 15-32
(2004) (presenting a modified version of this argument).
57
Eisentrager, interestingly, characterized the question before the Court as ultimately “one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authorities”—a separation of powers, or, we might say, an interbranch conflicts case, rather
than an international one. See 339 U.S. at 765; see also Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The decision in Eisentrager indicates that there is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.”). Before
the district court in Rasul, the Executive tried a somewhat more subtle tack, asserting
that while the petitioners might have some rights, they were for the Executive to determine. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2002), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2686
(2004). See also Fairman, supra note 23, at 619-20 (noting the possibility that a matter
may be governed “by law of the United States as found by the executive branch of the
Government”). But this Court has been emphatic about its exclusive role as constitutional interpreter; for better or for worse, litigants nowadays are entitled to the Court’s
Constitution and no other. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 78 (2004) (questioning the modern Supreme Court’s rejection of popular constitutionalism and arguing for greater deference to the constitutional interpretations of the
executive and legislative branches). Hamdi confronts this issue and gives a clear an55
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conflicts more generally—less relevant, certainly, than if the Court
were to hold that aliens abroad enjoy Due Process rights. There is, I
think, almost no chance that the Court will take this latter course. To
a naïve reader of the Rasul opinion, however, it might seem an equally
plausible outcome. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like
58
the habeas statute, makes no mention of citizenship or geography.
The straightforward textualist methodology the Court employed with
the statute would suggest a similar conclusion: the protections of the
Due Process Clause extend to any person alleging that the U.S. government has deprived him of liberty without due process of law. The
59
words of the Constitution require nothing more. And so, as Justice
Ginsburg put it recently, “[o]ne might assume, therefore, that [the
Bill of Rights] guides and controls U.S. officialdom wherever in the
60
world they carry our flag or their credentials.”
This argument can claim not only an affinity with the Rasul
Court’s methodology but also some intuitive appeal. If we do cherish
constitutional freedoms, if we do think that constitutional rights are,
swer: if constitutional rights are at stake, the judicial power will not be turned aside.
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at stake.”).
58
Louis Henkin (though certainly not a naïve reader) made this point twenty
years ago: “The choice in the Bill of Rights of the word ‘person’ rather than ‘citizen’
was not fortuitous; nor was the absence of a geographical limitation. Both reflect a
commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings.” Louis Henkin, The
Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985).
59
This analysis, of course, ignores the Rasul Court’s reference to the presumption
against extraterritoriality. 124 S. Ct. at 2696. The textualist still has resources, however. It is now well settled that American citizens abroad can invoke the Constitution
against the U.S. government. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957). Given that degree of extraterritorial scope, the lack of any textual distinction between citizens and
noncitizens (and the equally settled proposition that aliens within the United States
can invoke Due Process rights, see, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 10203 (1976)), would suggest that the Constitution must afford rights to aliens outside the
U.S. as well. My point here is not to endorse this argument, which, as the text notes,
tilts rather strongly against our current jurisprudence. It is rather to suggest that a
more sophisticated methodology is desirable.
60
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 334 (2004). The
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law tentatively endorses the same position, though
in this regard it is less a restatement than a prognostication. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 cmt. b (1987)
(“Although the matter has not been definitely adjudicated, the Constitution probably
governs also at least some exercises of authority by the United States in respect of some
aliens abroad.”).
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in some normative sense, right, it is surprising that the accident of ge61
ography should control the ability to invoke them. Why should a
governmental action repugnant to our deepest values become anodyne merely because it occurs outside our borders?
It might come as a surprise to the naïve reader, then (though undoubtedly not to any of this symposium’s participants), to learn that,
as Justice Ginsburg went on to observe, “that is not our current juris62
prudence.” Why it is not—and whether it should be, or more particularly what form the analysis of that question should take—is the
subject of this Article. The next Part takes a fairly brief trip through
the case law, offering an historical perspective on the evolution of our
jurisprudence with respect to the extraterritorial scope of federal law
and the Constitution. Because it provides an illuminating sidelight
here as elsewhere, I also discuss the contemporaneous development of
conflicts jurisprudence.
II. DOCTRINE: A HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
FROM THE CONFLICTS PERSPECTIVE
Early cases took a strong and unequivocal position on the scope of
both the Constitution and federal law more generally. In 1891, the
Court stated flatly that “[t]he constitution can have no operation in
63
another country.” With respect to federal law, the proclamations
were equally forceful; in 1883 the Court announced the proposition
“[t]hat the laws of a country have no extra-territorial force” as “an ax64
iom of international jurisprudence.”

61

“Accident” is of course a loaded word, an avatar of the “mere fortuity” invoked
by courts in domestic conflicts cases to diminish the importance of a geographical
connecting factor. See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting the plaintiff’s argument that it was a “mere fortuity” that the air traffic control
center directing their plane was located in Indiana). Sometimes geography is indeed
relevant, not in the crude territorialist sense, but because it relates to the purpose of a
law (speed limits being the standard example). And to call the location of the Guantanamo prison camp accidental is to indulge a naivete beyond that of even the most
committed textualist. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Commander in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs.”).
62
Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 334.
63
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). The petitioner in Ross had been convicted
by a consular court in Japan of a murder committed aboard an American ship in a
Japanese harbor, and he protested that this process deprived him of the rights to a
grand jury indictment and a jury trial. Id. at 454-58.
64
Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883).
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Territoriality likewise held sway in domestic conflicts, where it was
frequently considered to have the status of a constitutional rule, if not
a law of nature. Declaring a contract executed in New York valid under New York law, the Court went on to observe that “this validity was
not and could not be affected by the laws of the State of Texas, as in
the nature of things such laws could have no extraterritorial opera65
tion.” In very few cases was the territorialist thesis supported by any
reasoning. The Court’s characterization of territoriality as an “axiom”
neatly captures the extent to which it worked as the starting point,
rather than the conclusion, of judicial analysis. Some explanation can
be given, however: territoriality was a device for allocating authority
among coequal sovereigns, be they states of the Union or nation66
states. Chief Justice Marshall traced the reasoning in The Antelope:
“No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than
the perfect equality of nations. . . . It results from this equality, that no
one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself,
67
but its legislation can operate on itself alone.”
The rigidity of the territorialist rule should not be overstated; exceptions existed for lands subject to no sovereign and even for appli68
cation of a state’s law to its own citizens. By 1909, Justice Holmes was
65

Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1917); see also, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) (“[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of
Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down
the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of
their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the
Constitution depends.”). Other famous products of the territorialist era include the
civil procedure chestnut Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
66
See generally Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 188 (explaining territoriality in
“public international law, adjudicatory jurisdiction, and conflict of laws” as “variations
on a single theme—that of accommodating conflicting policies of independent sovereigns”).
67
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825). Territoriality is, of course, not the only
means of implementing an equality norm. Modern conflicts theory has largely rejected territoriality, but I have suggested that it need not discard equality, and that in
fact the Constitution provides courts with antidiscrimination norms that could be used
to police state choice-of-law rules. See Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at 2518-33 (“In
particular, Full Faith and Credit prevents consideration of the fact that a particular
right is a local one, and Privileges and Immunities similarly prevents the fact that a
party is (or is not) a forum domiciliary from having weight.”).
68
See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (noting the
exceptions); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 189-90 (same). With respect to constitutional law, one might expect even a looser approach. As Catherine Struve observed
to me in conversation, extraterritorial application of a rule—such as a constitutional
prohibition—restricting the power of state authorities is not easily seen as an infringement on the sovereignty of another state. The fact that territorialism does not make
any such practical assessment of state interests is precisely the modern criticism.
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characterizing it as a presumption to be applied “in case of doubt,”
69
though also “the general and almost universal rule.” Even as a presumption, however, and even as it grew progressively riddled with exceptions and escape devices, territoriality proved a poor fit in an increasingly interconnected world. Gradually it gave ground as the
70
In personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer
twentieth century moved on.
71
yielded to International Shoe; in domestic conflicts, the “choice of law
revolution” swept from the law reviews into the state courts, though
72
not entirely and not without resistance.
For a time, the jurisprudence with respect to federal law seemed
to be keeping pace. Justice Holmes’s analysis of the scope of federal
law in American Banana was, in the words of Larry Kramer, “pure con73
flict of laws,” citing familiar conflicts cases and even Dicey’s treatise.
And when Learned Hand took the fateful step, in Alcoa Steamship, of
extending the Sherman Act’s prohibitions to conduct abroad affecting
commerce within the United States, he commented that limitations
on the extraterritorial scope of federal statutes “generally correspond
74
to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”
69

American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357, 356.
See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 192-93 (discussing the roughly contemporaneous erosion of territoriality in international law, personal jurisdiction, and conflict
of laws).
71
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945).
72
For an exhaustive description and assessment of the “revolution,” see Harold L.
Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983).
73
See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 186-87 (observing that Holmes supported
the opinion by citing such cases as Slater v. Mexican National Railroad and Milliken v.
Pratt).
74
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). See
also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976)
(“[T]o determine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a
matter of international comity and fairness . . . [w]e believe that the field of conflict of
laws presents the proper approach . . . .”). With its invocation of international comity
and fairness, Timberlane displays a theoretical sophistication beyond that of Alcoa. Alcoa
treated the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act as a single question: either U.S.
law applies or it does not. 148 F.2d at 443-44. Timberlane recognized the possibility
that while an act might fall within the scope of the Sherman Act, the defendant might
nonetheless escape liability out of deference to the authority of a foreign state. 549
F.2d at 613-15. In conflicts terminology, it allowed for the possibility that U.S. law
might not always prevail in a conflict with foreign law. See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note
44, at 193-94 (discussing Alcoa, Timberlane, and other conflicts-infused extraterritoriality
cases). Timberlane’s analysis thus contained two steps, rather than one. See 549 F.2d at
613 (“[T]here is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of
whether the interests of, and links to, the United States—including the magnitude of
the effect on American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of
other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”). See generally
70
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With respect to the Constitution, the Insular Cases, decided between 1901 and 1922, seem perhaps even slightly ahead of their time.
They did not explicitly invoke the field of domestic conflicts (though
references to doctrines of international law were of course frequent);
but the various Justices seeking to ascertain the Constitution’s scope
deployed an array of interpretive methodologies impressive in their
breadth and largely sensible in their substance. Indeed, the approaches are both more appealing to the modern eye than the fine
reticulations of Joseph Beale’s metaphysics and more sophisticated
than some of the Court’s subsequent categorical invocations of terri75
toriality.
The methodological richness and diversity on display in the Insular Cases makes them worth considering in some detail, for the ap76
proaches they offer will recur. The analyses in Downes v. Bidwell are
77
illustrative. Justice Brown, writing for the Court, began with the observation that textualism alone is inadequate: “The Constitution itself
78
Instead, “[i]ts solution must be
does not answer the question.”
found in the nature of the government created by that instrument, in
the opinion of its contemporaries, in the practical construction put
79
upon it by Congress, and in the decisions of this court.” The particular issue presented in Downes was whether Puerto Rico counted as part
of the United States for the purposes of Article I, Section 8’s demand
that duties, imposts, and excises be “uniform throughout the United
80
States.” Brown’s analysis considered the textual distinctions the Constitution makes between the United States and “place[s] subject to

Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 280 (endorsing two-step analysis).
75
In particular, the White and Brown opinions in the Insular Cases suggest to me
an awareness that “applying” the Constitution abroad need not mean deciding cases
with foreign elements as though they were wholly domestic. That is, White and Brown
are willing to grant that Congress cannot act outside the restraints of the Constitution,
while at the same time asserting that cases with foreign elements may come out differently than they would if they were wholly domestic. This is a crucial insight in conflicts
theory. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1051 (1989) [hereinafter Kramer, The “Unprovided-For” Case] (“One must determine
the rule of decision for the case actually before the court, and this may not be the rule
used in a similar but purely domestic case.”).
76
182 U.S. 244 (1901).
77
Neuman’s account of Downes, see NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 85-89, is similar to
the one offered here. While I differ in some respects—notably my understanding of
Justice White’s theory, see infra note 89 and accompanying text—I generally found little
to improve on.
78
182 U.S. at 249.
79
Id.
80
Id.
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their jurisdiction,” the “object” of Section 8 and related clauses, and
83
Though he concluded that
the history of American expansion.
Puerto Rico was not part of the United States for the purposes of the
impost clause, he went on to observe that some constitutional prohibitions might “go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all”
84
and therefore restrain it “irrespective of time and place.”
Justice White, concurring, offered the theory that would eventu85
ally win majority support. White started with the proposition that, as
“every function of the government [is] derived from the Constitution,
it follows that that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential
86
in so far as its provisions are applicable.” To ascertain the applicability of constitutional provisions, he suggested “an inquiry into the situa87
tion of the territory and its relations to the United States.” Territories that had been “incorporated into and become an integral part of
88
the United States,” were, with respect to the availability of constitutional rights, indistinguishable from the states of the Union: all constitutional provisions applied. Unincorporated territories lay beyond
the scope of constitutional provisions (like the impost clause) that referred to “the United States.” But, for White, that did not mean that
they lay beyond the Constitution entirely. Like Brown, he offered a
backstop of limitations on Congressional power that operated without
respect to geography:
Undoubtedly, there are general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor
of the liberty and property of the citizen which are not mere regulations
as to the form and manner in which a conceded power may be exercised, but which are an absolute denial of all authority under any circumstances or conditions to do particular acts. In the nature of things,

81

Id.
Id. at 278.
83
Id. at 279.
84
Id. at 277; see also id. at 283 (“Even if regarded as aliens, [the inhabitants of
Puerto Rico] are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in
life, liberty and property.”). Brown also asserted without qualification, however, that
“the Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials therein conducted . . . .” Id. at 270. One could say that the Justices who decided the Insular Cases
shared the dominant territorialist premise and differed only over its application, but I
think this would overlook the extent to which Brown and White endorsed some version of what I will call the model of limited government. See infra Part III.D.
85
See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1905) (adopting distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories).
86
Downes, 182 U.S. at 289 (White, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 293.
88
Id. at 299.
82
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limitations of this character cannot be under any circumstances tran89
scended, because of the complete absence of power.

Chief Justice Fuller, writing for four dissenters, rejected as “occult”
White’s distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories, contending that in practice it amounted to the contention that
“Congress has the power to keep [a territory], like a disembodied
shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefi90
nite period.” He likewise dismissed as “idle” the attempt to draw a
“distinction between a total want of power and a defective exercise of
91
it.”
Fuller spent most of his energies attacking Brown’s reading of
precedent and White’s distinctions; he offered little in the way of a
positive theory for determining the scope of the Constitution. The
first Justice Harlan, who joined Fuller’s dissent but also wrote separately, did offer such a theory. Harlan found textual support for the
extension of the Constitution to Puerto Rico in the Supremacy Clause.
An early draft, he observed, made the Constitution, federal laws, and
treaties “the supreme law of the several States”; the convention had
92
changed this phrase to “the supreme law of the land.” The amendment, Harlan claimed, demonstrated an intent to “embrace[] all the
peoples and all the territory, whether within or without the States,
over which the United States could exercise jurisdiction or author93
ity.”
Harlan thus reasoned that “[t]he Constitution is supreme over
every foot of territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the
94
United States.” Going further—and suggesting the normative underpinning of his conclusion—he asserted that “[b]y whomsoever and
wherever power is exercised in the name and under the authority of

89

Id. at 294-95. It is now conventional to describe White’s approach as holding
that inhabitants of unincorporated territories enjoy only “fundamental” rights. See,
e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 (1957) (describing the Insular Cases as “conceding
that ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights applied everywhere”); NEUMAN, supra note 56,
at 87 (“[E]ven unincorporated territories benefit from ‘inherent, although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free government . . . restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed.’” (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at
291)). I take White’s reference to an “absence of power” more seriously and read him
to be endorsing what I will call the model of limited government. See infra Part III.D.
90
Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 373.
92
Id. at 382-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 383.
94
Id. at 385.
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the United States, or of any branch of its Government, the validity or
invalidity of that which is done must be determined by the Constitu95
tion.” Harlan’s ultimate position, then, seemed to be that constitutional protections were triggered not by geography, nor even necessarily by citizenship, but rather by the simple exercise of United States
96
power.
Eisentrager was a less impressive performance, deploying, among
97
98
other things, a fairly rigid territoriality. But in Reid v. Covert, the
Court slipped the bonds of territoriality, at least with respect to
American citizens, a full six years before the first significant judicial
99
salvo of the domestic choice-of-law revolution. Reid considered the
consolidated cases of two American women who had killed their servicemen husbands abroad, one in England and one in Japan. Each
was tried before a court martial abroad, and each sought habeas relief
on the basis of constitutional rights to grand jury indictment and jury
100
The Court initially rejected the petitions on the theory that
trial.
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ jury guarantees did not extend to

95

Id. He also rejected the distinction between constitutional provisions regulating
power and those denoting an absence of power, see id. at 383, and, echoing Fuller,
termed the idea of incorporation “occult,” id. at 391.
96
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 87 (“Harlan unambiguously expounded a conception of the Constitution based on the mutuality of legal obligation.”). The sort of
mutuality that Neuman endorses seems somewhat narrower than Harlan’s; Neuman
sees only certain exercises of power as carrying with them constitutional rights. See id.
at 99 (“[A]liens abroad could not claim the protection of constitutional rights under
this version of the mutuality of obligation approach every time the United States acted
to their disadvantage.”).
97
Though not as rigid as later cases alleged, a fact to which the Rasul Court appeared sensitive. Compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Eisentrager for the proposition that the “Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to
aliens outside the territorial boundaries”), with Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (observing that
“all six of the facts” about the status of the Eisentrager petitioners were “critical to [the
Court’s] disposition” of the constitutional claims).
98
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
99
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), is generally considered the first
significant judicial adoption of the new conflicts learning. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same
Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.
J. 1965, 1992 n.105 (1997) (“[F]irst honors here are typically awarded to the New York
Court of Appeals for its opinion in Babcock v. Jackson.” (citation omitted)). Rumblings
could be heard before Babcock; the same court adopted a “center of gravity” approach
to a contracts case in 1954, see Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954), and
the Indiana Supreme Court had adopted the “significant contacts” approach (again in
a contract action) as early as 1945, see W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423
(Ind. 1945).
100
See Reid, 354 U.S. at 3-5.
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Americans tried “in foreign lands for offenses committed there”
101
(though the Due Process Clause did).
After granting reargument, however, the Court reversed itself.
Accidents of geography, it suggested, should not control the relationship between Americans and their government. “When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he
102
happens to be in another land.” Like the Insular Cases, Reid contains
no explicit invocation of conflicts theory. But its reasoning echoes (or
presages) the domestic rejections of territoriality. Its ringing endorsement of the relevance of citizenship is as forceful as any penned
103
by Brainerd Currie, and its disparagement of geography would become a staple of torts cases involving accidents in the course of inter104
Even though it does not bill itself as a conflicts case,
state travel.
Reid easily holds its own with the self-professed conflicts decisions of its
105
era.

101

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
103
Compare id. at 6 (describing the importance of citizenship as being “as old as
government”), with CURRIE, supra note 46, at 85 (concluding that Massachusetts is concerned with the welfare of Massachusetts domiciliaries). The domiciliary focus in domestic conflicts can take on an unpleasant parochialism. See Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961) (“Our courts should if possible provide
protection for our own State’s people against unfair and anachronistic treatment . . . .”).
104
Compare Reid, 354 U.S. at 6 (arguing that an American citizen’s rights “should
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land”), with, e.g., Kilberg,
172 N.E.2d at 527 (“Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the
traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States through and over which
they move. . . . The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous.”).
105
Reid also contains other approaches. Some language echoes the Insular Cases’
conception of a limited government bound always by the Constitution. See Reid, 354
U.S. at 5-6 (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution.”); id. at 12 (rejecting the proposition that the Constitution is territorially limited as “obviously erroneous if the United States Government,
which has no power except that granted by the Constitution, can and does try citizens
for crimes committed abroad”). Some language takes a textual tack. See id. at 8 (“The
Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . are also all inclusive with their sweeping references to
‘no person’ and to ‘all criminal prosecutions.’”). Still other passages suggest that constitutional rights appertain to the obligation of obedience or subject status. See id. at 6
(observing that English inhabitants of settled colonies “take with them . . . allegiance to
the Crown, the duty of obedience [but also] all the rights and liberties of British Subjects” (quoting 2 CHARLES M. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN; THEIR ADMINISTRATION AND GOVERNMENT 175 (London, John Murray 1869))).
102
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This harmonious state of affairs did not persist. Though the Supreme Court’s mid-century cases dealing with the scope of the Jones
Act had abandoned territorialist reasoning sufficiently to win the ap106
proval of Brainerd Currie, in 1990, territorialism returned as a vigorous presumption for the interpretation of federal law in EEOC v.
107
Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco). And while that decade saw lower
federal courts relatively adventurous in enforcing constitutional rights
108
in favor of aliens abroad, the Supreme Court seemed to be engaged
in a similar territorialist retrenchment. In United States v. Verdugo109
Urquidez, the Court rejected a Mexican national’s attempt to invoke
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the alleged Fourth Amendment
110
violation created by a warrantless search of his house in Mexico.
After Reid, pure territoriality was no longer an option for the Verdugo-Urquidez Court, and the opinion displays some creativity in accommodating that precedent. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, relied in part on the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the
right of the people” to justify a distinction between nonresident aliens
and “a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
111
considered part of that community.”
He also consulted the “available historical data” in an attempt to ascertain “the purpose of the
112
Fourth Amendment,” turned to the practice of the Framers’ con113
temporaries to shed light on the original understanding, and toured
114
the doctrine, giving special attention to the Insular Cases.
106

The cases are Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959),
and Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). For Currie’s evaluation, see CURRIE, supra
note 46, at 361-75.
107
499 U.S. 244 (1991). For a thorough discussion of the territorialist recrudescence in Aramco, see Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44.
108
See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342-44 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding serious questions as to Fifth Amendment rights of Haitian refugees detained in Guantanamo), vacated sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S.
918 (1993); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1991) (entertaining an
Establishment Clause challenge to federal funding of foreign religious organizations
located outside United States); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th
Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence obtained from a warrantless search of an alien’s residence abroad), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
109
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
110
Id. at 274-75.
111
Id. at 265.
112
Id. at 266.
113
Id. at 267.
114
See id. at 268-69 (“And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases
to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United
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The culmination of this methodological eclecticism, however,
suggests a thwarted yearning for the simple clarity of territoriality:
what follows in the opinion is a surprisingly univocal reading of Eisentrager that finds its “rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth
115
Later cases would repeat that characAmendment . . . emphatic.”
terization, citing Eisentrager (and Verdugo-Urquidez) for the simple
proposition that the “Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to
116
aliens outside the territorial boundaries.”
Perhaps more disturbing than the return of territoriality (though
related to it) is the one-step nature of the Court’s analysis: the supposition that to “apply” the Constitution extraterritorially means to decide cases with foreign elements as though they were wholly domes117
tic.
That is, the majority seems to assume that in order to avoid
granting Verdugo-Urquidez a full panoply of Fourth Amendment protections—including the exclusionary rule, which is not a constitutional right at all, but rather a judicially-crafted remedy—it was required to announce that the Amendment had “no application” to
118
federal action against aliens abroad.

States Government exercises its power.”).
115
Id. at 269. The Court did, admittedly, employ the familiar anti-territorial tactic
of characterizing Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the United States as the product of
chance. See id. at 272 (“We do not think the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of
whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him
to the United States at the time the search was made.”). This, however, is simply asserting the primacy of one territorial factor (location of the house) over another (location
of the owner).
116
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
117
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Aramco suggests a similar understanding of
what it means to apply federal law abroad. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 255 (1991) (asserting that if Title VII applies abroad to govern the conduct of an
American employer of an American citizen, it must also govern the conduct of a
French employer of an American citizen); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 219-20
(making the same point).
118
For instance, one searches the majority’s discussion of the Insular Cases in vain
for any acknowledgement of Justice White’s assertion that “[t]he Government of the
United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or by implication from that instrument.” Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 288 (1901) (White, J., concurring). Similar language does
make an appearance in the analysis of Reid v. Covert, but it is then swept aside as applying only to citizens. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (“Since respondent is not a
United States citizen, he can derive no comfort from the Reid holding.”). The separate
concurrence of Justice Kennedy appears motivated by the desire to reject this binary
vision and reaffirm the universal subordination of the federal government to the Constitution. See id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government may act only as
the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.
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A general description of what is happening here is that the
Court’s approach to extraterritoriality has become detached from
modern conflicts theory. There are two more specific components of
the general phenomenon. First, the Court does not seem to see extraterritoriality cases as presenting a conflicts issue. Only this blinkered
perspective could have made it plausible to rely so heavily on the presumption against extraterritoriality in Aramco, almost half a century
after territoriality had been widely rejected in domestic conflicts and
119
personal jurisdiction. Second, when it does not see itself as deciding
a conflicts case (and as the first point shows, it only quite rarely does),
the Court seems to have forgotten (or decided to ignore) the choice120
of-law revolution almost entirely. For instance, no one familiar with
the evolution of the Court’s conflicts jurisprudence would think that
its early decisions constitutionalizing territoriality are good law after
the relaxation of constitutional constraints in cases such as Clay v. Sun
121
122
Insurance Office, Ltd. and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague. Yet one of
the most forceful of those early cases, New York Life Insurance Co. v.
123
Head, resurfaced like a coelacanth in 1996, quoted at substantial

But this principle is only a first step in resolving this case.” (citations omitted)).
119
Likewise, the Court’s account of what constitutes a “conflict” between U.S. and
foreign law in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993), is far
removed from the domestic conflicts understanding, and its apparent belief in both
Hartford Fire, see id. at 795-98, and Aramco, see 499 U.S. at 252-53, that the scope of federal law relates to the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is simply baffling. See
Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust
Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 750, 750 n.3 (1995)
(discussing the Hartford Fire Court’s apparent conclusion that “the applicability of U.S.
law and conduct abroad is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”). For general assessments of the value of conflicts thinking as applied to the question of the extraterritorial application of federal law, see, for example, HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 888-90 (4th ed. 1994); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and
Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101,
121-43 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of
Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUIL DES COURS
D’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 311, 328-29 (1979); Harold G.
Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281-85 (1982); Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choiceof-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1801-05 (1992).
120
Perhaps conflicts scholars bear some of the responsibility for this; conflicts theory is not considered a huge success. And indeed, I will suggest that some standard
conflicts approaches may not be especially helpful in determining the scope of the
Constitution. See infra Part III.
121
377 U.S. 179 (1964).
122
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
123
234 U.S. 149 (1914).
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length for the long-rejected proposition that extraterritorial applica124
tion of state statutes violates the Constitution.
Rasul does little in the way of reconnecting the Court’s analysis of
territorial scope with conflicts theory. Its textualist approach to determining the scope of the habeas statute is certainly not a recognizable conflicts methodology, and to the extent that the substance of
the constitutional sequel can be forecast, it seems far more likely to
focus on the special attributes of Guantanamo Bay than to take issue
with the territorialist paradigm. I intend to suggest that a properly
constituted conflicts theory could be useful in resolving the constitutional issue, but before considering conflicts, it is worth looking a bit
more closely at the techniques the Court has been using. The preceding discussion has been little more than a chronological tour of the
case law, and a somewhat disorganized one at that. Reconciling the
various decisions is no easy task—indeed, I suspect it is impossible—
because they reflect and embody quite different theories of extraterri125
toriality. Rather than attempt a synthesis, the following Part extracts
those theories and assesses them individually.
One test of theory is its fit with practice. That criterion is of limited utility here; precisely because the Court has not been consistent
in its methodology, we cannot expect any model to capture the doctrine perfectly. We may, however, demand at least moderate consistency with settled law, and we may test the approaches on the basis of
their ability to resolve the question of extraterritorial scope in an intel126
lectually coherent way.

124

[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond
the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional
barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful
authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the
Constitution depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the Constitution that it has rarely been called in question and hence authorities directly
dealing with it do not abound.
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 n.16 (1996) (quoting Head, 234 U.S. at
161).
125
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 97 (“In the case of American constitutionalism,
conflicting conceptions of geographical scope have led to serious indeterminacy in the
modern period.”).
126
See id. at 98 (“The question of scope must be resolved primarily by deliberative
choice among alternative approaches on the basis of their normative characteristics
and their coherence with less unsettled constitutional practices.”).
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III. THEORY: APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The task to which I turn in this Part—isolating and evaluating the
different approaches that different Justices have offered to the question of the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution—has been performed before. Most notably, Gerald Neuman’s book Strangers to the
Constitution, and its predecessor article Whose Constitution?, set out a
taxonomy that includes four different models: universalism, member127
I am fortunate not to be
ship, mutuality, and global due process.
writing on a blank slate, and I have benefited greatly from Neuman’s
work. My own reconstruction differs from his in significant respects,
however: I include universalism, membership, and mutuality, but add
territoriality (which Neuman considers part of mutuality) and replace
global due process with limited government, a related model that I
think better captures the intellectual history of the relevant arguments. (These distinctions will become clear later.) I also attempt a
more critical evaluation of the models. Many of them, I will suggest,
have much less resolving power than is commonly supposed, and
some turn out to beg the question entirely.
A. Universalism/Textualism
The simplest approach to extraterritoriality would be to take the
Constitution’s text as a sufficient guide. Some constitutional provisions specify limitations on their scope, either geographical or personal. The impost clause at issue in Downes, for instance, applies only
128
and the Fourteenth
to taxes “throughout the United States,”
Amendment’s equal protection clause makes specific reference to the
129
“jurisdiction” of the states. Likewise, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause appears to restrict its protection to “citizens of the United
127

See id. at 4-8; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 915-21
(1991). The article refers to the mutuality model as “municipal law”; I have chosen to
focus on the book as the more recent statement of Neuman’s analysis. No discussion
of models of constitutional analysis would be complete without an acknowledgement
of Philip Bobbitt’s extremely helpful taxonomy of constitutional argument. See PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982). Bobbitt identifies six modes of argument: textual, historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical. The preceding discussion of the case law shows that these modes may
be employed in the service of various different positions, and this Part will demonstrate
that they are not tied to particular theoretical approaches to extraterritoriality either.
(For instance, although I call one approach textualism, textual argument may be made
in support of the social contract/membership approach as well. See infra Part III.C.)
128
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
129
Id. amend. XIV.
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130

States.”
A textualist, or at least one who believed textualism to be
the only permissible interpretive methodology, might then approach
the problem of scope by reasoning that constitutional provisions without textual limitations are available to anyone, regardless of citizenship
or geography.
The textualist model (which Neuman refers to as “Universal131
132
ism”) has never enjoyed much support among the Justices. A significant number have employed textualism as one among other
133
methodologies—Justices Brown and Harlan in Downes, Justice Black
134
135
in Reid, and Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in Verdugo-Urquidez —
but the analysis is more commonly used to narrow rights, rather than
to extend them, the counterexamples being Reid and the dissenting
opinions of Harlan and Brennan in Downes and Verdugo-Urquidez. The
Rasul Court’s embrace of textualism in setting the scope of the habeas
statute might give textualism a boost, but it would be an undeserved
one.
As already noted, conflicts problems typically arise precisely because legislatures do not specify the geographical or personal scope of
their statutes. To decide that such statutes (or, in the constitutional
context, such provisions as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause) are therefore unlimited in scope is abdication, not analysis.
Textualism does indeed tell us how to resolve the question—
something I will argue some other models do not—but it does not tell
136
us how to do so in a sensible way.
130

Id. One might also read the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” to identify the class of rights protected against abridgement, rather than
the class of rights-holders—that is, to indicate that the relevant privileges and immunities were those held against the United States under federal law, rather than the statelaw privileges and immunities referenced in Article IV. Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 119-20 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that Bill of Rights
guarantees and others “are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early
amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States”).
131
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 5-6 (describing an approach with no limitations
on people or places covered by the Constitution).
132
See id. at 6 (admitting that it has “played almost no role in American constitutionalism until recent years”).
133
See Downes, 182 U.S. at 251; id. at 382-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1957).
135
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); id. at 283 n.7
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
136
Neuman, consistent with his preference for mutuality, faults universalism for
suggesting that the United States would be required to respect the rights of aliens
abroad “in all the contexts in which it interacts with them; not just when it seeks to ap-
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B. Territoriality
Territoriality suggests that as each sovereign is supreme within its
geographical borders, its law, all of its law, and only its law, is there in
force. The Constitution, then, could be invoked by persons within
(some definition of) the United States, and not by anyone else. This
model can claim at least an historical ascendance and, perhaps, a renewed modern appeal. (There are second acts in the lives of American constitutional doctrines.) Certainly, no rival conception can boast
137
such repeated and unqualified endorsement by the Supreme Court.
On the other hand, no other approach has the defect of being so
demonstrably false. Territoriality, in domestic conflicts and international law, was understood not as a sensible way to allocate legislative
138
jurisdiction (though some digging can get you there ) but rather as a
limit on the power of legislatures, imposed domestically by the Constitution and internationally by the law of nations. Practice proved the
premise false; neither constraint held up, and if Congress and state
legislatures can project power beyond their borders, so too can We
139
Perhaps more significant, territoriality suffered a cripthe People.
ply its law, but also when it exercises military force against them or interacts consensually in a commercial or foreign aid context.” NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 110. I will
suggest later that concerns about war—which have been raised by almost everyone with
whom I have discussed this issue—are significantly overstated. See infra notes 205-07
and accompanying text. Foreign aid is a more difficult issue, and I think it is probably
a good illustration of (though hardly the only reason) why pure textualism is a silly approach.
137
See, e.g., Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S 453, 464-65 (1891); Am. Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149,
163-64 (1914).
138
See supra Part II; Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 187-88 (describing territoriality as a method of accommodating conflicting policies). Kramer points to its relatively egalitarian allocation of authority as a selling point; another, more salient to the
judicial mind, might be its ease of application. Though determining the location of an
event can prove surprisingly complex, territoriality does allow judges to avoid the difficult task of deciding how domestic law should interact with, and perhaps be altered by,
foreign law when it is applied to events occurring outside the borders of a state or nation. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
139
One might nonetheless attempt to defend territoriality as the original understanding, but this is less than fully convincing. The Framers doubtless understood the
scope of the Constitution in territorialist terms, but no more so than the scope of national power more generally, and they could as plausibly be characterized as understanding that the Constitution would follow the exercise of such power, or even that it
should have the maximum scope possible. Neuman, in fact, characterizes territoriality
as a version of the mutuality approach. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7. I do not, on
the grounds that territoriality was initially understood to be based on the limits of sovereign power rather than mutuality, and that it departs from mutuality in its modern
applications.
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pling blow in Reid v. Covert; as long as Americans abroad enjoy constitutional protection (a position the Court is not likely to abandon),
territoriality will not fit the doctrine. Still, territoriality could be recast
as merely a sensible approach, not a necessary restraint, and given the
Court’s inability to settle on a particular theory, demanding a perfect
fit with existing case law is surely asking too much. It is worthwhile,
then, to consider territoriality on its own merits.
From a more theoretical perspective, territoriality faces additional
challenges. First, as Currie took great pains to point out, it is not a
140
consistently sensible way of determining the scope of a law. Second,
territoriality is somewhat question-begging. Grant that the Constitution “applies” within the borders of the United States. Does that
mean that cases involving aliens arising within the U.S. should be resolved as though they were entirely domestic—i.e., as though the alien
were a citizen? Territoriality, as a one-step approach, suggests that the
answer is yes, which aligns it with the cases holding that even unlawful
141
entrants enjoy constitutional rights.
That may be a normatively desirable and intellectually supportable
142
answer, but territoriality provides it only by fiat. The reservation of
some benefits to citizens is common. It is not unimaginable that the
purposes of the Constitution would be better served by denying some
protections to unlawful or involuntary entrants, perhaps those who
143
have entered the country in order to make war on it or those we
have deemed enemies and brought within our borders for incapacita144
(There would, of course, remain the antecetion or punishment.
140

See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 180-81 (arguing that “[t]he territorialist conception has been directly responsible for indefensible results”); see also, e.g., Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 210-11 (“Indeed, while much of modern conflicts theory remains
unsettled, if anything is established, it is that across-the-board territoriality is a poor
system for resolving conflicts.”).
141
See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that “once an alien
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies
to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here
is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”) and cases there cited.
142
Eisentrager attempted to offer a somewhat more complete justification, that
presence implied protection. But the logic of this rationale is limited—and Eisentrager
did limit it—to those who have entered lawfully, and perhaps excludes involuntary entrants as well. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“[L]awful presence
in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives [the alien] certain rights . . . .”).
143
Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1942) (holding, on the basis of petitioners’ undisputed status as unlawful belligerents, that they could be tried by military tribunals rather than civil courts).
144
But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy,
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dent problem of what rights these people could assert in the effort to
prove that they did not fit the category into which the government
placed them.) Or rather, to look at the matter from the opposite side,
if there is a good reason that such people should have constitutional
rights within the U.S., it is hard to see why it should make a difference
that the government has (fortuitously or strategically) elected to hold
them outside its borders. With such a lengthy list of defects, territoriality should not be an appealing model.
C. Social Contract/Membership
A textualist who started her close reading at the beginning of the
Constitution would find what appears to be a highly useful indicator
as to its scope and purpose in the Preamble:
We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
145
this Constitution for the United States of America.

Justices have indeed relied on the Preamble to argue for limits on
constitutional scope. Ross v. McIntyre, somewhat surprisingly, used it
to fund a territorialist approach, arguing that “[b]y the constitution a
government is ordained and established ‘for the United States of
146
America,’ and not for countries outside of their limits.” This version
of the social contract theory seems to beg the question (though only
slightly more obviously than do others): grant that the Constitution
empowers and restrains only the government of the United States;
why does it follow that it restrains the government only within the
United States? There is no obvious answer to this question, and the
social contract theory is more commonly used (as Neuman’s term
147
“membership” suggests) to restrict rights to citizens.

J., concurring) (“All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”). Justice Rehnquist’s majority
opinion could in fact be read to suggest that illegal aliens enjoy lesser rights. See id. at
282 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing alarm at the implication); cf. Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution
has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not come lawfully within our territory cannot claim any protection from its provisions.”).
145
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
146
140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
147
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 6-7 (discussing social contract theory under the
rubric of “Membership Models”).
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Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez is perhaps the
most notable example. In a portion of the opinion disavowed by Justice Kennedy, Rehnquist read “the people” referenced in the Fourth
Amendment as related to the “People” of the Preamble: “a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
148
part of that community.”
Rehnquist’s argument relates to the Fourth Amendment specifically, but the Preamble could be taken to support a more general approach. The Constitution declares itself to be established to secure
the blessings of liberty for a limited class: the People and their “Posterity.” It seems plausible, then, to reason that the benefits of the
Constitution are generally reserved for the People—not the ratifiers
and their biological descendants, of course, but the American community Rehnquist described. Some constitutional provisions explicitly
reject this restriction, notably the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, which specifically extends to all persons within the
149
jurisdiction of the States, but those may be considered exceptions
that prove the rule: absent such a clear textual indicator, the background membership assumption should control.
From this perspective, it might seem clear that aliens abroad
should not enjoy constitutional rights. Neither, as Rehnquist intimated in Verdugo-Urquidez, should illegal entrants, and indeed the
rights of lawful resident aliens might seem to be in some jeopardy.
Neuman calls this model Hobbesian in its implications, and it quite
neatly tracks Hobbes’s pronouncement that “the Infliction of what
evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the
benefit of the Commonwealth, and without violation of any former
150
Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature.”
A first problem with the membership model is that, in its most uncompromising version, it does not fit our doctrine, which does extend
constitutional rights to illegal aliens, involuntary entrants, and even
151
aliens abroad who are defendants in civil suits. Responses are avail148

Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265. For Kennedy’s disavowal, see id. at 276.
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-14 (1982) (relying on the text of the
Equal Protection Clause to protect undocumented aliens).
150
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 109 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 360
(C.B. McPherson ed. 1985) (1651)).
151
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 113 (noting that American courts observe constitutional limitations when trying nonresident alien defendants). For an interesting discussion of the Due Process rights of nonresident alien defendants, see Lea Brilmayer &
Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L.
149
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able. One might argue that this signals that the doctrine should be
revised, a position that probably has its supporters. More plausibly,
one might point out that it is quite likely in the interest of citizens to
152
extend constitutional rights to some categories of aliens.
But at this point the question-begging aspect of the membership
model becomes apparent. Grant that the Constitution exists and extends rights only for the benefit of the People. Why does it follow that
it extends rights only to the People? Of course, it does not. The People might worry that ruthless treatment of aliens by their own government would expose them to equally ruthless treatment at the
153
They might think it beneficial to extend
hands of foreign powers.
constitutional rights as a means of encouraging commerce and immi154
gration. They might worry that a government that had experienced
the exercise of totally unchecked power against aliens would prove a
greater danger to citizens. Or they might simply be repulsed by the
idea of the government—their agent—acting in their name with no
obligation to observe even the most fundamental norms of decency
155
and fairness.
These issues are familiar from conflicts, where they surface in the
debate over how to determine state interests. Currie’s early work pos-

REV. 1217, 1223 (1992). NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 11-12, also observes that Hobbism
comes at the price of delegitimating claims that aliens have an obligation to obey U.S.
law, but I fear I am too much of a positivist to find this consideration particularly
weighty.
152
Madison presented this argument in the course of opposing the Alien Act, as
Neuman describes. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 59 (characterizing Madison as arguing that “[t]he rights (natural or otherwise) of aliens and of citizens are intertwined,
and oppression of aliens could indirectly harm citizens”).
153
See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers in Support of Petitioners at 25, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (“[T]he lives of
captured American military forces may well be endangered by the United States’ failure to grant foreign prisoners in its custody the same rights that the United States insists be accorded to American prisoners held by foreigners.”), available at 2004 WL
99346; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By respecting the
rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other nations to respect the rights of our citizens.”).
154
See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 59 (“Arbitrary government power over aliens
would disrupt and discourage desired relations between aliens and citizens, whether
marriage, friendship, commerce, or education.”).
155
See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our national interest is defined by [our moral] values and by the need to preserve our own
just institutions.”); A Statement of Conscience: Not in Our Name, at http://
www.nion.us/NION.htm (last modified Apr. 15, 2003) (“We believe that all persons
detained or prosecuted by the United States government should have the same rights
of due process.”).
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ited, for illustrative purposes, a “selfish state,” interested only in the
156
welfare of its own citizens. Currie himself acknowledged that states
might pursue more enlightened policies, and it was soon pointed out
that considerations of reciprocity and game theory might lead even
the most selfish state to moderate its assertions of authority and re157
strictions of rights. The premise that the Constitution exists only for
the benefit of Americans, in short, tells us very little about whether
and under what circumstances it extends rights to aliens.
This is not a reason to reject the membership model. It is rather a
demonstration that selecting the membership model does not in fact
determine the scope of the Constitution. There remains the question
of what scope best promotes the interests of the American People—a
question that, interestingly enough, is familiar from the conflict of
158
laws. I will suggest that this question is indeed the fundamental one,
and that it can usefully be addressed by the methodology of conflicts.
For present purposes, however, it is enough to conclude that the
membership model does not provide an answer.
D. Limited Government/Global Due Process
If the question of what constitutional rights aliens possess proves
knotty, an analysis that does not work in terms of rights might seem an
attractive alternative. Rather than identifying rights that defeat the
exercise of government power, one could seek out limitations on that
power. If the government simply lacks the power to take a certain act,
considerations of geography and citizenship might seem irrelevant,
and the question of who bears particular rights can be avoided.
Invocations of limited government are common in the extraterritoriality case law. Justice Brown in Downes acknowledged the existence

156

See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 89 (assuming a “selfish state” to examine hypothetical conflict of laws cases).
157
See id. (arguing that even for the state seeking to maximize its own interests,
applying foreign law would sometimes be rational). For the suggestion that game theory will lead to cooperation, see Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 343-44.
158
In its constitutional guise, the question may be somewhat more freighted. A
judge attempting to divine state interests, as Currie noted, is always subject to the “advice of those who know better”—namely state legislatures. CURRIE, supra note 46, at
592 (emphasis omitted). Legislative correction is a real possibility; for instance, after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Aramco, Congress amended Title VII to specify extraterritorial scope. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat.
1071, 1077-78 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1). Correction by the People,
on the other hand, requires the much more difficult process of constitutional amendment.
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of “such prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Congress
to act at all, irrespective of time or place,” and observed that “when
the Constitution declares that ‘no bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed,’ and that ‘no title of nobility shall be granted by the
United States,’ it goes to the competency of Congress to pass a bill of
159
that description.” Justice White, likewise, asserted that “those absolute
withdrawals of power which the Constitution has made in favor of
160
human liberty are applicable to every condition or status.” More recently, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez argued that “[t]he
focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and
cannot do, and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may
161
be taken.”
The idea that individual liberty is secured by limited government
has a distinguished pedigree. The Federalists argued that an explicit
bill of rights to protect particular freedoms was unnecessary, as the
government had been given no power to invade them. The Constitu162
tion itself, they asserted, was a bill of rights.
It might seem, then,
that an analysis based on the limited powers of the federal government offers a way to impose at least some restraints on governmental
action against aliens abroad.
In fact, however, matters turn out to be a good deal more complicated. We may grant for argument’s sake the Federalist claim that the
national government has not been given the power to invade fundamental liberties and, its corollary, that the Bill of Rights is largely declaratory. Aliens abroad are not protected by this line of reasoning—
at least, not protected to the same extent as citizens invoking Bill of
Rights guarantees—without the further premise that the federal government wields no power in its conduct of foreign affairs that it does
not wield domestically. And that premise, of course, runs headlong

159

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901).
Id. at 297-98 (White, J., concurring).
161
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (stating that “[t]he United States
is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution” (citations omitted)); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on Downes for the proposition that “the constitutional prohibition against establishments of religion targets the competency of Congress to enact legislation of that
description—irrespective of time or place”).
162
See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.”).
160
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into United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., where Justice Sutherland famously announced that the federal foreign affairs power was
inherent in sovereignty and not dependent on the Constitution for its
164
source.
The source and scope of the foreign affairs power is an area of in165
tense controversy, and Curtiss-Wright is a favorite academic target.
166
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continues to cite it, and “[m]ost
scholars assume that Congress has a general power to legislate in for167
eign affairs matters.” This power is not, of course, superior to con168
stitutional rights, but it is a general power of the sort wielded by
169
state legislatures or by Congress in regulating the territories, rather
than the discrete set of enumerated powers granted to the federal
government in domestic affairs. That sets the bar substantially higher,
163

299 U.S. 304 (1936).
“The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true
only in respect of our internal affairs.” Id. at 315-16.
165
See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42
WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 380 & n.6 (2000) (stating that “[m]uch academic labor has
been devoted to proving Curtiss-Wright wrong” and citing examples). A fierce debate
over similar inherent powers arose earlier in the context of anti-Chinese immigration
legislation, and the Court adopted a position similar to that of Justice Sutherland. See,
e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (characterizing “[t]he
right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain
conditions, in war or in peace” as “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign
and independent nation”). The assertion of inherent power provoked a fierce dissent
from Justice Field, who protested that “[t]he existence of the power thus stated is only
consistent with the admission that the government is one of unlimited and despotic
power, so far as aliens domiciled in the country are concerned.” Id. at 755-56 (Field, J.,
dissenting). Even accepting that complete power over immigration is an inherent aspect of sovereignty, a question remains: since in America the people, and not the government, are sovereign, where is the evidence that this power has been entirely delegated to the government? See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 121 (asserting that this theory
“conflated the sovereignty of the nation with the power of the federal government”).
166
See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (citing Curtiss-Wright in support of presidential discretion in foreign affairs); Toll v. Moreno, 458
U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing Curtiss-Wright for federal government’s “broad authority over
foreign affairs”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977
(3d ed. 2000) (noting, critically, “[t]he traditional international perspective—that internal limits on the powers of national governments are without significance to foreign
affairs”).
167
Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001).
168
See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 n.9 (2003) (noting that even
on the Curtiss-Wright understanding, federal power remains “[s]ubject . . . to the Constitution’s guarantees of individual rights”).
169
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
164
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for it means that a limited government analysis could not take the
form of modern “liberty-preserving” limited government decisions
170
such as the Court’s recent federalism cases. It would have to identify
inherent and necessary limitations on governmental authority rather
than the lack of a textual basis for the exercise of power.
That requirement does not doom the project, for the Supreme
Court has frequently invoked just such limits. The model can be
171
traced as far back as Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull, which
asserted that the “purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact . . . as they are the
foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the
proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will
172
Thus, Chase’s analysis did not rely on aflimit the exercise of it.”
firmative rights but, rather, absences of power. There were some
things, he reasoned, that the people forming a government would
simply not want that government to do, and they would not delegate it
the necessary power. “[I]t is against all reason and justice,” he wrote,
“for a people to intrust [sic] a legislature with such powers; and there173
fore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”
This style of reasoning exerted significant influence in the extraterritoriality context in the early twentieth century, as the Insular Cases
demonstrate. It blossomed in the police power cases of the Lochner
era, during which the Court aggressively patrolled the boundaries of
174
legislative authority. And while the Lochner jurisprudence has lost its

170

See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
171
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
172
Id. at 388; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“It may
well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe
some limits to the legislative power . . . .”).
173
Calder, 3 U.S. at 388.
174
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a pathbreaking study of the
Lochner era that sees it as concerned with the proper scope of the police power, see
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1993). For similar accounts, see, for example,
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 6-7 (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
NEW DEAL 243-44 (2000). A contrary account, which sees the issue as one of rights,
rather than absences of power, may be found in David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental-Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO.
L.J. 1, 12 (2003). The analysis of Lochner speaks explicitly of the limits of legislative
power. See 198 U.S. at 58 (“We think the limit of the police power has been reached
and passed in this case.”). Perhaps more tellingly, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897), the case frequently cited for the creation of a fundamental right to contract,
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luster, the limited power refrain continues to be heard, both in lower
175
court extraterritoriality decisions and, though not with the utmost
176
clarity, in the Supreme Court itself.
How could a modern Court discern the limits of federal power?
The Lochner Court found its textual hook in the Due Process Clause,
177
and a similar methodology exists in the Insular Cases. More recently,
other Justices have endorsed an approach that asks whether federal
178
action against aliens abroad violates due process, and so this might
179
seem a viable way to proceed.
Again, however, things are more complicated than they first appear. The Lochner-era Court’s vision of a government limited to the
180
evenhanded pursuit of the public interest, or at least its vision of the
deals with an attempt by Louisiana to regulate an insurance contract entered into in
New York, and was decided on the grounds that Louisiana lacked the power to legislate
extraterritorially. (It was not questioned, for example, that New York could have regulated the contract.) See id. at 588 (noting that “the contract was made in New York,
outside the jurisdiction of Louisiana”); id. at 591 (noting that a state’s power “does not
and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making contracts of the nature involved in this case outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the state, and which are also
to be performed outside of such jurisdiction”). That Allgeyer is in fact a conflicts case
has been noted. See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process,
45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 85-87 (2001) (looking at Allgeyer from a “choice-of-law angle”
and noting the decision’s “distinctly procedural flavor”); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
324, 378 (1985) (“In any event, Allgeyer was a choice-of-law decision, not, strictly speaking, a substantive one.”).
175
See Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1991).
176
In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court struck down a Texas law
prohibiting same-sex sodomy not on the grounds that it infringed on any preferred
right but rather that it “further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,” a statement that would
seem to place the law outside the bounds of legislative power. Id. at 578. For scholarly
assessments of Lawrence, see, for example, Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004)
(suggesting that Lawrence is best understood as a fundamental rights model).
177
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901). Justice Brown did, additionally, suggest that the prohibitions of Article I, Section 9 indicated absences of
power, as, perhaps, did the First Amendment. See id. at 277.
178
See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[O]ne can
say, in fact, that the question of which specific safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context overseas can be reduced to the issue of
what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular
case.”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (same, quoting Harlan).
179
Thus the model of limited government evolves into what Neuman calls “global
due process.” NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 8.
180
See generally sources cited supra note 174 (analyzing the fundamental concerns
of the Lochner-era Court).
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judiciary as a branch of government competent to define and defend
181
this boundary, is gone. After United States v. Carolene Products, West
182
183
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, and Ferguson v. Skrupa, the general understanding is that the legislature is superior to the judiciary in the determination of the public interest, for reasons of both institutional
184
competence and democratic accountability. Lawrence aside, it is rare
for a court to find an absence of governmental power. Instead, a person seeking to resist governmental action must usually invoke a right
185
And insufficient to overcome the exercise of government power.
deed, modern due process jurisprudence is typically concerned with
what rights are contained in the Due Process Clause, rather than the
186
limits of governmental power.
At first blush, this changed understanding might seem to be a
boon to aliens abroad. If due process is the issue, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been held to incorporate most
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, why not apply this understanding to Fifth Amendment Due Process (which has already
shown sufficient appetite to incorporate equal protection) and conclude that aliens abroad possess all the Bill of Rights guarantees that
bind the states?
This line of reasoning might seem excessively clever, but there is a
very real link between the Insular Cases and those dealing with applica-

181

304 U.S. 144 (1938).
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
183
372 U.S. 726 (1963).
184
See also, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).
185
I hope the distinction between the analytical structure of the two arguments
(absence of power as opposed to right defeating power) is clear. In case it is not, consider this: Antonio Morrison’s victory against the United States in Morrison clearly did
not depend on any right to rape Christy Brzonkala (though that was the liberty the
Court protected), but rather on the absence of power in the federal government to
regulate his behavior. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (noting
that any remedy “must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the
United States”). Likewise, the Louisiana statute at issue in Allgeyer, see supra note 174
and accompanying text, was held not to constitute due process of law because it was
unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to liberty of contract—namely that its extraterritorial scope exceeded the power of the legislature. By contrast, modern cases featuring constitutional challenges to state action typically ask whether an affirmative right
(under, for example, the First Amendment) defeats the exercise of state power.
186
This is so even where the text of the relevant constitutional provision—for instance, the First Amendment—suggests an absence of power rather than the presence
of a countervailing right.
182
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188

tion of the Bill of Rights against the states. In Hawaii v. Mankichi,
Justice White concurred with the majority’s conclusion that inhabi189
tants of Hawaii need not be afforded the grand and petit jury rights
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments on the grounds that these rights
190
He cited as support Hurtado v.
were not sufficiently fundamental.
191
California, which held that the Due Process Clause did not require
states to proceed by grand jury indictments. Justice Harlan dissented
in both cases on the grounds that jury trial rights were fundamental in
192
their nature. Identifying fundamental due process rights worthy of
extraterritorial application might well proceed parallel to the incorporation of such rights against the states.
Still, a problem remains, and a serious one: the transition to a
rights-centered understanding destroys the promised benefits of the
model of limited government. If the question is whether governmental action comports with due process, and we have adopted the modern understanding of due process as a matter not of an absence of
government power but of affirmative rights against that power, we
have in fact come full circle. Due process rights are rights like any
others; they may be granted to some people and withheld from others, depending upon factors such as geography and citizenship. Em187

In each case, the limited government analysis essentially asks, in the manner of
Justice Chase, whether reasonable people would give their government the power to
perform a certain act. Application of the Bill of Rights to the states eventually came to
be governed instead by an analysis that asked whether the asserted right was “fundamental.” See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 139-40 (1998) (describing “selective incorporation”). Likewise, the Insular Cases
now tend to be understood as adopting an approach that turned on the fundamentality of the right at issue. See id. at 276-77 (describing “the little-noted link” between the
incorporation and extension of the Bill of Rights to territories). Amar’s brilliant analysis of the incorporation debate suggests that although it is correct to address incorporation right-by-right, fundamentality is not the correct criterion. Instead, the relevant
question is whether the right at issue is “a personal privilege . . . of individual citizens,
rather than a right of states or the public at large.” See id. at 218-23. Similarly, I shall
argue, one considering extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights should not inquire into fundamentality but rather ask whether extending a particular right to this
new context will serve its domestic purpose. See infra text accompanying notes 225-26.
188
190 U.S. 197 (1903).
189
Mankichi himself was a Japanese national, see id. at 234 (Harlan, J., dissenting),
but his lack of citizenship played no role in the Court’s decision.
190
Id. at 221 (White, J., concurring).
191
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
192
See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 244-45 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at
545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 88 (observing
that “Harlan’s literal demands continued his ongoing dispute with his colleagues over
the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the state governments through the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
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bracing the modern understanding that due process consists of affirmative rights simply brings us back to the question of whether aliens
abroad should hold particular constitutional rights.
In fact, even the promise of the older version was more apparent
than real. Justice Chase’s argument that the purposes of government
will determine its scope and powers is plausible when that power is
exercised against members of the political community. It is plausible
for what might be called veil of ignorance reasons: the people might
well hesitate to create a government with the power to take property
193
from A and give it to B (to use one of Justice Chase’s examples) because they could not predict whether they or their posterity would be
A or B. More generally, it might well seem odd that a government
created in part to protect property should be given the power arbitrarily to seize property from those it is supposed to protect, and likewise
with life and liberty. But if A is an alien, an outsider to the community, the matter appears in a different light. The government is not
created to protect the property, lives, or liberty of aliens, and no principle of logic suggests that people would not create a government with
the power to deal with aliens as ruthlessly as it pleases—for instance,
194
And so the model of
to take their property and give it to citizens.
limited government also proves ultimately unable to determine the
scope of the Constitution.
E. Mutuality of Obligation
Neuman’s preferred model is what he calls “mutuality of obliga195
tion.”
According to this model, constitutional rights “are prerequi196
sites for justifying legal obligation.”
Thus, “when the United States
asserts an alien’s obligation to comply with American law as a justification for interfering with the alien’s freedom or property, the alien is
presumptively entitled to the protection of all constitutional rights in
197
the interaction.”
Like the other models, this one has a substantial presence in the
case law, though frequently in dissent. Mutuality is the key to Justice
193

See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
Even to enslave them. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 119-20 (1825)
(observing that the slave trade is “contrary to the law of nature” but “could not be pronounced repugnant to the law of nations”).
195
NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7.
196
Id. at 8.
197
Id. at 99. Neuman notes that specific text or other factors may override the
presumption. See id.
194
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Harlan’s dissent in Downes, which would impose constitutional restraints “[b]y whomsoever and wherever power is exercised in the
name and under the authority of the United States, or of any branch
198
It appears in a supporting role in Reid, where
of its government.”
Justice Black’s plurality opinion invoked the example of English colonists who took with them “the duty of obedience” and also “all the
199
And mutuality constituted
rights and liberties of British Subjects.”
the central argument in the dissents of Justices Brennan and Black200
mun in Verdugo-Urquidez.
This model has the potential to answer the question of constitutional scope, though some lines remain to be drawn. In VerdugoUrquidez, Brennan and Blackmun differed over what sort of exercise of
government power would trigger correlative constitutional rights, with
Blackmun writing separately to emphasize his belief that the mutuality
requirement was triggered only by what he called the “exercise of sov201
ereignty.”
Brennan’s understanding appears broader, at times ap202
proaching Harlan’s standard of the mere exercise of federal power.
If constitutional rights are called into play by any federal action,
mutuality approaches universalism: since the Constitution is generally
good only against the government in the first place, that sort of mutu-

198

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 385 (1901) (Harlan J., dissenting).
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957). The quoted passage suggests, but does not
make explicit, a connection between the rights and the duties. Describing the rights as
those of “British Subjects” supports the implicit link.
200
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“Today the Court holds that although foreign nationals must abide by our
laws even when in their own countries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth
Amendment when it investigates them for violations of our laws.”); id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“At the very least, the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable correlative of the Government’s power to enforce the criminal law.”); id. at 284 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“Mutuality is essential to ensure the fundamental fairness that underlies
our Bill of Rights.”); id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a foreign national
is held accountable for purported violations of United States criminal laws, he has effectively been treated as one of ‘the governed’ and therefore is entitled to Fourth
Amendment protections.”).
201
Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun also opined that the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment did not apply to extraterritorial searches. Id.
202
Brennan’s discussion of the Fourth Amendment as an absence of power, see id.
at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting), suggests a broad scope for its operation, as does his
repetition of the Reid observation that the government “can only act in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.” Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6). He did apparently intend to exclude wartime operations from the scope of the Amendment, but it is not clear what else. See id. at 292
(discussing the exceptions inherent in foreign “non-law enforcement activities not directed against enemy aliens in wartime”).
199
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ality imposes no limits beyond those already set in place by the state
action requirement. The plausibility of such an extensive conception
of mutuality may be questioned. The idea that aliens abroad should
enjoy exactly the same rights as Americans in their interactions with
203
I have
the government appears impractical, and perhaps absurd.
already discussed the failings of textualism and, as someone always
asks, must the military give enemy soldiers hearings before shooting
them in battle? Neuman’s restrictive conception of the circumstances
triggering mutuality appears to be motivated in part by a desire to
204
avoid the reductio ad absurdum of “due process of war.”
This concern strikes me as significantly overstated. The Hamdi
Court noted that the government can hold a rights-bearing citizen as a
205
prisoner of war, and if it can do that, it can presumably shoot him
dead on the battlefield if he engages its forces. Indeed, the government conducted years of military operations against the quintessential
rights-bearers—American citizens on American soil—and while the
Civil War did produce some episodes of questionable constitutional206
ity, no one to my knowledge has suggested that the battle of Gettys207
burg was one.
Thus it seems possible—perhaps even desirable—to draw the
boundaries of mutuality more broadly. What happens, one wonders,
if the government does not assert authority over aliens by reason of
laws they have allegedly violated, but simply sweeps them up for detention and interrogation on the grounds that they might have useful
information? Can it detain them incommunicado, and subject them

203

One might also suppose that mutuality analysis is simply a first step, and that
subsequent analysis might either suggest that aliens’ rights should be lesser, or defeat
the presumption of applicability entirely. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 115 (noting
that rights are subject to analysis for reasonableness and exigency).
204
Neuman, supra note 127, at 990; see also NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 100 (curtailing the application of mutuality “to the residents of an adversary nation during armed
hostilities”).
205
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) (“There is no bar to this
Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.”).
206
See generally, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
207
See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (“Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. This was admitted with regard to
killing men in the actual clash of arms . . . .”) Even police officers, operating under
the rather different law enforcement model, are authorized in some circumstances to
use deadly force without a hearing. On the distinction between the models of war and
law enforcement, and their application to terrorism, see Noah Feldman, Choices of Law,
Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2002).
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to stress positions and sleep deprivation, without the Constitution having anything to say?
These issues certainly have practical importance, but from a theoretical perspective they are mostly quibbles. The mutuality model
does have the capacity to set the scope of constitutional protections in
a reasonably sensible fashion, and in that respect it is superior to the
other models. Is that enough to warrant our endorsement?
Neuman’s most sustained argument in favor of the mutuality
208
model takes the form of comparing it to the others. If these models
were the only choices, that argument would be satisfactory. I think,
however, that there is another alternative to be considered, which is
conflicts methodology. The following Part asks what light conflicts
can shed on the scope of the Constitution, and vice-versa.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY FROM A CONFLICTS
PERSPECTIVE
From one perspective, the utility of conflicts methodology in determining the scope of the Constitution might seem obvious. Determining which rights particular people can invoke under particular
circumstances is the bread and butter of conflicts thinking. From another, if we bring the problem of Guantanamo out of the subtext, it
might not. Conflicts analysis is conventionally understood as a means
of deciding which of a number of different sovereigns has authority to
regulate a transaction. In Guantanamo, however, the issue is not
whose law (or whose Constitution, except in the sense of Neuman’s
article); it is whether the detainees are beyond the Constitution’s
scope—strangers to it, in Neuman’s evocative phrase, or entirely invisible. This feature need not, however, stop us from at least trying to
apply some different conflicts methodologies. If they seem incapable
of dealing with the question, that may tell us as much about the
methodologies as it does about Guantanamo.
A. Territoriality
I have already criticized territoriality as a conflicts methodology,
and its application to the Guantanamo detainees does not redeem it.
Territoriality offers very little help in resolving the problem. It simply
tells us that if Guantanamo is within the territory of the United States,
208

See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 109-16 (comparing mutuality to universalism,
the Hobbesian membership approach, and global due process).
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the Constitution applies; if not, it does not. This premise will produce
different answers depending on whether we define territory by technical notions of sovereignty or by practical considerations of jurisdiction and control. It might also depend on how we construe the location of the acts complained of. For instance, the Rasul petitioners
sued the President and other high-ranking executive officials, based
on decisions made and orders given within the United States. Those
actors are indisputably subject to the Constitution—though one might
respond that if the Constitution does not protect aliens abroad, orders
209
to detain such people without due process do not violate it.
This shows one thing about territoriality, which is that its localiz210
ing rules tend to devolve into metaphysical hairsplitting.
It also
shows that territoriality does not offer much in the way of a sensible
resolution. It does, or could, tell us something about the scope of the
Constitution, but it considers only one factor (geography), and it employs that factor in a mechanical way. Territoriality resolves the problem of allocating authority between sovereigns by confining each to an
exclusive sphere. Having drawn geographical lines on the basis of authority, territoriality goes on to suggest that once it is determined
where an event takes place, the legal consequences of that event may
be determined as if it were wholly domestic.
It is for this reason that I suggested above that the territorialist
model might beg the question. To say that the Constitution applies
within the United States is not the same as saying that it grants the
209

Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2748-50 (2004) (rejecting the
“headquarters” doctrine).
210
This is not to say that careful geographical analysis is not needed in questions
of extraterritorial application of the Constitution. The Verdugo-Urquidez Court seems
quite right, for instance, to observe that since a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at
the time of the search, rather than when the evidence is introduced, the location of
the property is more significant than the location of the trial. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). Similarly, while a Fifth Amendment selfincrimination violation occurs when an improperly obtained confession is introduced,
the propriety of the obtainment must be determined by taking into account where it
occurred. If the action of federal officers abroad is not subject to Fifth Amendment
constraints—a position I do not endorse—then subsequent introduction of a confession obtained without Miranda warnings should be no more problematic than introduction of a confession obtained by some private party who did not administer the
warnings. I thank Alex Sistla for this observation, which runs against the standard
analysis. See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1723-26 (2002) (arguing that because “the privilege against
self-incrimination is a trial right[,] . . . whether the interaction occurs within the borders of the United States or abroad becomes immaterial to the applicability of the
privilege if the suspect later stands trial in the United States”).
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same rights to all persons within the United States. Territoriality, as
a one-step approach, does not distinguish between the question of
whether U.S. law supplies the rule of decision and displaces competing laws (a question of priority) and the question of whether it grants
212
rights to the parties invoking it (a question of scope). If, as per the
conventional understanding, it answers the latter question, it does so
on the basis of a factor (geography) whose relevance to that question
213
it does not explain. Unsurprisingly, strict territoriality has fallen out
of favor in domestic conflicts for essentially this reason.
Perhaps the best that can be said for territoriality is that it simplifies the work of judges by allowing them to avoid the difficult questions of how to operationalize constitutional provisions abroad. How
to apply the warrant “requirement” of the Fourth Amendment to for214
eign searches, for instance, is far from obvious.
Of course, the history of constitutional law is one of adaptation of doctrine to new circumstances, but there is some reason to think that international
application of constitutional provisions will present unusually difficult
issues; it is more likely, for one thing, to bring the courts into conflict
with the Executive’s handling of foreign affairs. The appeal of territo211

Obviously, some distinctions are made in the text itself; my concern is with
those further distinctions that might be made on the basis of status factors such as illegal or involuntary entrance.
212
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by
Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 148-49 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt,
Renvoi] (distinguishing between scope and priority).
213
That is, territoriality is based on an understanding of the respective authority of
different sovereigns, in particular that sovereigns cannot project their law beyond their
borders. But that premise does not tell us why they should extend rights equally to all
within their borders, something they clearly have authority to decline to do. Neuman’s
interpretation of territoriality as mutuality does offer an explanation: parties within a
sovereign’s jurisdiction may claim rights as correlatives to their obligations under its
law. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7-8. This is quite likely the best argument that can
be made, but in the modern world where federal law is pervasively extraterritorial in
scope, it is no longer an argument for territorial restrictions on the scope of the Constitution.
214
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (noting the “sea of uncertainty as to what
might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad”); id. at 279
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Warrant Clause has no application to
searches abroad because “American magistrates have no power to authorize such
searches”). One might respond that the Fourth Amendment actually imposes a reasonableness requirement, not a warrant requirement, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762-81 (1994), or that an American
magistrate can indeed authorize searches by American authorities as far as the American Constitution is concerned (leaving aside, that is, the question of whether foreign
law can effect a prohibition). It is true, however, that applying constitutional provisions to government action abroad would raise some new issues.
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rialism is thus not inexplicable: just as it did in domestic conflicts, it
seems to offer a simple solution to otherwise difficult problems. This
argument has not carried the day in domestic conflicts, however, and
it is too much a counsel of despair to hold great appeal in the international setting. We should at least consider whether we can do better.
B. The Second Restatement
The Second Restatement would tell us that the law governing the detainees’ claims is that of the sovereign with the most significant relationship to the case. To identify that sovereign, we would consult the
215
familiar list of section 6 factors. The inquiry is underdetermined in
most cases, but let us suppose that here it suggests the United States.
This analysis does not seem, however, to answer the question of
whether aliens abroad can claim rights under the United States Constitution. At least, it is an extremely poorly-designed way of doing so.
The section 6 factors identify the sovereign with the greatest claim
to authority; that is, they are designed to resolve conflicting claims of
authority. They form what I have called a rule of priority, which lets
216
courts pick between competing claims of right.
Here, however, we
are dealing with an issue of the scope of the Constitution. The Second
Restatement blends some scope-related concerns into its rule of prior217
ity, but it has no distinct scope analysis. That is, it does not concern
itself with whether an individual should actually be able to claim rights
under the law it determines is “applicable.”
The neglect of scope analysis makes the Second Restatement largely
useless in resolving the problem of Guantanamo. It tells us that U.S.
law applies in one sense—that the case should be decided according
to U.S. law. But that we knew already; the detainees will obviously not
be able to get relief under Cuban law. It does not tell us whether the
Constitution applies, in the sense of granting rights that plaintiffs may
invoke.
Exactly the same defect appears in the Second Restatement’s treatment of domestic conflicts. Having identified the sovereign with the
most significant relationship to the issue, the Second Restatement then

215

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 212, at 149.
217
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(c) (noting the relevance of states’ interests and policies). These are, I will suggest, essentially the considerations that should come into play in determining whether a law grants a party a
right.
216
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seems to contemplate deciding the case under that sovereign’s law as
though it were a purely domestic case—it runs together the two
senses, distinguished in the preceding paragraph, in which a law
might “apply.” Or, to use the terminology I believe is more helpful,
the Second Restatement appears to assume that its rule of priority will
also be used to determine the scope of a sovereign’s law. This can result in peculiar anomalies.
The basic problem is this: the Second Restatement tells courts to apply some sovereign’s law on an issue without asking whether that law
(or the law of some other sovereign) actually grants the parties
218
If it selects a law that does not grant rights, two equally unrights.
appealing possibilities present themselves. First, as the Second Restatement seems to suggest, a court might go ahead and apply that law as
though the case were purely domestic—i.e., enforce rights that do not
exist according to the courts of the sovereign whose law has been selected. I think there is something wrong with that resolution; indeed,
I think that in the interstate context the problem is of constitutional
219
magnitude. A second alternative would be to select a law according
to the Second Restatement methodology and then engage in a process of
interpretation to determine whether that law grants rights to the party
invoking it. If it doesn’t, the court could simply decide the issue
against that party. This approach, however, neglects the possibility
that the law of some other sovereign (one with a less significant relationship) might grant that party rights, and, again, this neglect is
problematic.
C. A Two-Step Model
What is needed, as I and others have suggested, is an approach to
220
conflicts that consists of two steps. The first step concerns itself with

218

Suppose, for instance, that two individuals from territorialist State A are involved in a one-car accident in Second Restatement State B. A State B court might find
State A most significantly related on some issue of loss-allocation, even though State A
courts would rule that A law gives neither party any rights on these facts. To hold that
State A law “applies” in both senses of the word “apply”—that is, to hold not only that
the case will be decided under State A law, but also that it will be decided as if it were
purely domestic to State A—ignores the authority that State A courts should have in
setting the scope of their own law. Astute readers will recognize this as the renvoi
problem, and I have argued at (much) greater length elsewhere that the renvoi problem points to a fundamental defect in conventional conflicts thinking, found in both
territoriality and the Second Restatement. See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 212, at 165-67.
219
See id. at 137-42.
220
See Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 280-83 (advocating a two-step ap-
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questions of scope. The court should ask whether the laws the parties
invoke actually grant them rights. This analysis might reveal that only
one party has rights, in which case the court can simply enforce those
221
Or it might turn out that neither party has rights, in which
rights.
222
case the suit can be dismissed. Last, it might be that each party has a
right under the law of a different sovereign, in which case the court
223
would need to decide which right should prevail.
For this second
step, the court should apply a rule of priority.
224
Rules of priority are not at issue in the Guantanamo case. The
only question is whether the petitioners come within the scope of the
Constitution, and in particular the due process clause. This is the
question we began with, and it is time now to see how a proper conflicts theory could help to answer it.

proach); Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at 2485-88 (distinguishing between questions
about the scope of rights and questions about conflicts between rights). Kramer suggests, and I agree, that this approach is an application of the basic insights of Brainerd
Currie. I would call it interest analysis, but nothing turns on the genealogy, and the
question of how interest analysis should be understood has proved surprisingly divisive.
See Letter from Larry Kramer to Harry C. Sigman, Esq. (Aug. 4, 1994), reprinted in Appendix B, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455 (1995) (noting differences among modern
interest analysts). Consequently, I will simply acknowledge a debt to Currie (for those
who find the two-step model consistent with his thinking) while disavowing any attempt to impute this precise model to him (for those who do not).
221
This would correspond to Currie’s false conflict. See CURRIE, supra note 46, at
77-107.
222
This would correspond to Currie’s unprovided-for case. See id. The solution of
dismissing for failing to state a claim was first suggested by Larry Kramer. See Kramer,
The “Unprovided-For” Case, supra note 75, at 1060-64 (advocating dismissal in cases where
the plaintiff has no right to recover under either state’s laws).
223
This would correspond to Currie’s true conflict. See CURRIE, supra note 46, at
77-107.
224
In other federal extraterritoriality cases, they might be—that is, aliens abroad
might in some circumstances be able to invoke the protections of a foreign law authorizing the acts alleged to violate American law. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting possibility of deferring to foreign law in antitrust context); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952)
(same); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 586-87 (1953) (same with respect to Jones
Act). In Hartford Fire, the majority notably ignored this possibility, assuming that if a
particular act fell within the scope of the Sherman Act, the case must be decided as if it
were purely domestic. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993).
As Justice Scalia observed in dissent, federal law contains what I would characterize as a
built-in rule of priority, allowing “state regulatory statutes to override the Sherman Act
in the insurance field . . . .” Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That strongly suggests
that Congress might well intend foreign regulatory statutes to prevail in similar circumstances, a possibility revealed by the two-step analysis but obscured by framing the
question as simply whether U.S. law “applies.”

2005]

RASUL AND BEYOND

2065

How should a court go about doing scope analysis within the twostep model? Again, the methodology I suggest resembles that of interest analysis. As Kramer puts it, “[t]he basic premise . . . is that the
court should determine what policy a law was enacted to achieve in
wholly domestic cases and ask whether there are connections between
225
That is, the court
the case and the nation implicating that policy.”
should focus on the particular right at issue and whether its application to a case with foreign elements will promote its domestic pur226
pose.
This is not necessarily an easy task. A simplistic approach might
say that the purpose of the individual rights provisions of the Constitution is to protect particular liberties, and to the question “Whose
227
liberties?” respond, “Those of Americans, of course!”
But that is
nothing more than restating the question and answering it through a
crude application of the membership model. If we can do no better,
the methodology would merit the kind of accusations Lea Brilmayer
has leveled against interest analysis: that it simply substitutes a pre228
sumptive domiciliary focus for a presumptive territorial focus.
I think we can do better, both with interest analysis and the Constitution, though I will restrict my discussion here to the latter. Some
provisions—for instance, the Fourth Amendment—seem likely to pose
a substantial challenge. Without a well-developed theory of what the
Fourth Amendment is for, we are left asking whether its application to
searches of aliens’ property abroad implicates the “right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-

225

Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 213; see also, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking, supra
note 41, at 290-93 (demonstrating the methodology); Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at
2486-87 (same).
226
To some extent, this approach parallels the “refined incorporation” Akhil
Amar has suggested as the proper method of deciding whether a Bill of Rights provision binds the states. See AMAR, supra note 187, at 139-40. In particular, it focuses attention on the substance of the particular right, rather than attempting to resolve the
question of constitutional scope all at once, as the models considered in the preceding
Part seem, with the exception of limited government, to contemplate. Neuman does
suggest looking to the purpose of constitutional provisions, but he likewise appears to
do so at the wholesale rather than the retail level. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 97
(“To resolve the question of the proper scope of the individual-rights provisions of the
United States Constitution, it is useful to ask . . . what United States constitutional
rights are for.”).
227
Cf. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 85 (asserting that Massachusetts is concerned with
the welfare of “Massachusetts married women”).
228
See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 85-87 (2d. ed. 1995) (criticizing Currie’s
domiciliary focus).
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229

reasonable searches and seizures.” I confess the answer to this is not
obvious to me, though one might well conclude that a search for
items to be introduced at a U.S. trial as evidence of the violation of
230
U.S. laws brings its target within the community of the “people.”
Other provisions seem more tractable, which suggests to me that
the effort is worthwhile. Consider, for example, the First Amendment. The purpose of the speech clause has received substantial
scholarly attention, with conventional accounts tending to ring the
changes on two main themes: facilitating democracy by informing the
231
electorate and promoting self-actualization. The first of these might
be implicated by actions against aliens abroad, most obviously if they
232
are attempting to communicate with Americans. Alien communication to other aliens, by contrast, seems much less relevant to the First
233
As for
Amendment’s domestic purpose of facilitating democracy.
self-actualization, a domiciliary focus seems appropriate: it is hard to
see why the Constitution would be concerned with the selfactualization of aliens abroad. Thus it seems possible to conclude that
the government should have greater latitude in regulating speech
among aliens abroad than it does in the domestic context, at least as
234
far as the First Amendment is concerned.
229

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
This would amount to an endorsement of some form of mutuality in the
Fourth Amendment context. Supposing that the Fourth Amendment does grant aliens abroad some protection, it might also make sense to look to foreign standards to
determine what searches are reasonable.
231
See Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1250-52 (1997) (describing
“speaker-centered” and “listener-centered” models of the First Amendment).
232
In such cases, of course, Americans would be able to assert their rights as willing listeners under current doctrine. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S.
301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, this analysis might not change results very much, though it would allow the aliens to litigate in their own right. But the
very fact that the Court has reached similar results, by whatever rationale, indicates its
recognition that the First Amendment is at stake in such communications.
233
Thus, for instance, a federal decision to support a particular foreign political
party seems unlikely to trigger the same kind of “funding forum” concerns it might in
the United States.
234
This is not to say that attempts at such regulation would be a good idea, only
that on the account of the First Amendment developed in the text, the First Amendment would not be a barrier. If we understand the First Amendment differently—if,
for instance, we suppose that it has some moral dimension, reflecting a judgment that
governmental restraints of speech are intrinsically abhorrent—then we would likely
reach a different conclusion. If it were the case that the First Amendment did not bar
criminalization of speech among aliens abroad, however, I believe it should make no
difference if the government seeks to try defendants within the United States. This is
230
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The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment presents dif235
ferent issues. Again, substantial scholarship on its purpose exists.
Suppose that its purpose may be formulated as protecting a community within which neither a particular religion, nor religion in general,
is supported by compulsory individual donations or receives the en236
dorsement of the government. Is this purpose implicated by federal
action abroad?
The answer to this question is probably yes. Federal expenditures
in support of religion abroad clearly convey a message of governmental favoritism, and they compel individual taxpayers to support religions with which they may disagree. Thus, the Establishment Clause
should operate to restrain federal action abroad. That is not necessarily to say that aliens abroad should be able to bring claims. They are
not, generally speaking, taxpayers, nor can they argue that federal endorsement of religion marks them as second-class citizens, for they
are not citizens at all. In this case the purpose-based analysis tends to
accord with mutuality, as potential Establishment Clause violations are
unlikely to involve the assertion of authority over aliens. However, it
also answers the question of whether federal action abroad can violate
Americans’ Establishment Clause rights, which mutuality does not.
I do not claim that these analyses are authoritative. Others may
have different conceptions of the purpose of the provisions I have
considered, or different views on what sort of contacts implicate those
purposes. But they seem plausible enough to make me think the
237
methodology is sound.

contrary to Neuman’s understanding, see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and
Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2083 (2005), and
quite likely inconsistent with the practice of U.S. courts, but I think it is the correct
analysis. If speech among aliens abroad is unprotected by the First Amendment, then
it is outside the Amendment’s scope, in much the same way as if it had been deemed
obscenity or fighting words. The location of the trial makes no difference.
235
For a recent and comprehensive treatment, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual
Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002).
236
This statement does not do justice to the complexity of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and scholarship, but its accuracy is essentially irrelevant to the value of
the methodology I demonstrate.
237
In his gracious response to this Article, Professor Neuman questions the starting point of the approach: the premise that a purpose-based analysis of constitutional
provisions should look to the benefits they secure for Americans or within the United
States rather than their “value to rights-holders considered in the abstract or in a context that can be generalized.” Neuman, supra note 234, at 2080-81. As I hope the discussion in the text demonstrates, I certainly agree with Neuman that it would be a mistake to take this domestic focus as the last step—to adopt the crude version of the
membership model. But I do find it plausible as a first step because I believe that, as
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V. APPLYING CONFLICTS METHODOLOGY
TO GUANTANAMO
It is time now to return, again, to Guantanamo. Here the question to ask is what the purpose of the Due Process Clause is. One
purpose is to protect people from arbitrary government action, and if
that is all, then extending its scope to aliens abroad may seem tenuous. The U.S. Constitution probably has no general concern with the
welfare of aliens abroad. But if that is the only purpose, one might
also wonder why due process rights extend to aliens within the United
States. Is, perhaps, an additional aim of the Due Process Clause simply to prevent the government from engaging in arbitrary or despotic
acts?
One may construct pragmatic arguments for this suggestion and
tie them to the interests of U.S. citizens—a government in the habit of
tyrannizing aliens may be more likely to tyrannize Americans, for instance, or to disrupt Americans’ personal or commercial relationships
with aliens. I do not intend to diminish the significance of these concerns, but I would suggest another, which relates less to the immediate
interests of Americans and more to their values.
The United States government is not a principal. It is the agent of
the people, and it wields in our name the powers we have seen fit to
give it. It might be worthwhile to ask, then, in the manner of Justice
Chase, what sort of government we have created. Did we unleash
upon the world an agent with no obligation to respect even the most
238
What kind of a people would do
basic rights of our alien friends?
such a thing? Or more briefly, what kind of a people are we?

the Preamble suggests, the Constitution is concerned with America and Americans,
and the extension of rights to foreigners (wherever they are located) must therefore
be justified by some domestic consequence. It bears mention, however, that this
methodology is, in principle, compatible with Neuman’s mutuality thesis. If, as Neuman claims, one overarching purpose of U.S. constitutional rights is to legitimize U.S.
claims of authority, then that purpose might well be implicated by any assertion of authority over aliens abroad. See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 98 (“The rationale of the
mutuality approach has been the presumption that American constitutional rights and
the obligation of obedience to American law go together . . . .”). The idea is appealing. I wonder, however, how confident we can be in ascribing to the Constitution a
purpose to impose such a strong legitimacy constraint on the foreign affairs power.
The federal government would not be intrinsically illegitimate if the First Amendment
did not exist (is the British government illegitimate?), and so I do not think the legitimacy of the exercise of federal power abroad necessarily requires extension of all constitutional rights to those over whom authority is asserted.
238
Historical precedents exist. The Alien Act allowed resident aliens to be deported and in some circumstances imprisoned “so long as, in the opinion of the presi-
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This strikes me as the basic question. Laurence Tribe has argued
that many constitutional issues cannot be resolved without a choice of
239
values, and while I think that the set of such cases is actually relatively narrow, this may be one. The question of the due process rights
of the Guantanamo detainees, and of aliens abroad more generally,
240
comes down to a question of what our values are.
America does stand for things, in aspiration if not always in practice. Examining the consistency of governmental action with those
aspirations is a familiar means of constitutional adjudication. As Justice Brennan observed in Verdugo-Urquidez, “[f]or over 200 years, our
country has considered itself the world’s foremost protector of liberties. . . . Our national interest is defined by those values and by the
241
need to preserve our own just institutions.”
Over a century earlier,
Justice Mathews noted that “[w]hen we consider the nature and the
theory of our institutions of government [and] the principles on
which they are supposed to rest . . . we are constrained to conclude
that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely
242
personal and arbitrary power.”
Times of crisis test these principles. As the Supreme Court stated
in Hamdi:
dent, the public safety might require.” See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 747 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing Alien Act in a case involving governmental power to deport resident Chinese aliens). Madison responded in protest that
“[a]lien friends, except in the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal
law, and must be tried and punished according to the law only.” Id. at 750 (Field, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 556 (photo. reprint 1996) (2d ed. J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891)). “[I]t will surprise most people,” Field continued (speaking now to
the facts of Fong Yue Ting), “to learn that any such dangerous and despotic power lies
in our government . . . .” Id.
239
See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (arguing that a process-based theme of Constitutional interpretation requires “a full theory of substantive rights and values”).
240
And from this perspective, I believe that the modality of constitutional argument most relevant to the Guantanamo case is what Bobbitt terms ethical—one that
appeals to the basic animating values of our history and constitutional traditions. See
BOBBITT, supra note 127, at 93-119 (defining an ethical argument as one based in the
character of the American polity and providing examples of such arguments in constitutional law cases). Neuman’s reliance on social contract theory is likewise a form of
ethical argument. See supra Part III.C; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution,
66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 307 (1987) (suggesting we must look to “what kind of country we
are and wish to be” to determine the extraterritorial effect of American law).
241
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285-86 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
242
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886); see also Fong Yue Ting, 149
U.S. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting) (“Arbitrary and tyrannical power has no place in our
system.”).
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[I]t is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values
that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the prin243
ciples for which we fight abroad.
244

That is well and good as far as it goes.
The case of the Guantanamo detainees raises a further question: is it the values or the citizenship that is most important? Are we committed to these principles
only at home, or might they have some relevance abroad? This is a
stark choice, between honoring the principles we fight for and degrading them, between asserting that our rights are the only ones that
245
matter and demonstrating a decent respect for the opinions of
246
mankind.
What kind of a people are we? We have confronted this question
at other crises in American history, and the Court, responding to the
felt necessities of the times, has rendered decisions that cast neither it
247
nor us in the best light. Those cases are now viewed with regret, as
object lessons testifying that history vindicates neither undue restriction of the community of rights-bearers, nor blind deference to the
Executive. Rasul suggests, if nothing else, that these lessons have been
absorbed. Things may be different the next time round. No judicial
decision will restore the good will that the Executive has cost us. No
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Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648.
As things turned out, the Executive opted to release Hamdi rather than attempt to justify his detention in court. See Editorial, Freeing Mr. Hamdi, WASH. POST,
Sept. 24, 2004, at A24 (discussing Hamdi’s release and the surrounding issues). The
government agreed to release Hamdi on the condition that he renounce his U.S. citizenship. See id. Given his treatment at the hands of his (and our) government, Hamdi
might be excused for deeming this a small sacrifice. How significant a role his citizenship played in the outcome of his case will be determined by the aftermath of Rasul.
245
To simplify the analysis, Currie at one point hypothesized such a “selfish state,
concerned only with promoting its own interests.” CURRIE, supra note 46, at 89. But
he went on to admit the possibility that “such an attitude [might] be shocking, or unwise, or unjust, or unconstitutional.” Id.
246
See, e.g., Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2 n.5, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-342, 03-334) (“Members
of Parliament have employed every potential avenue to voice concern for the British
detainees and turn now to this Court as an alternative, independent route to ensure
that due process is provided.”), available at 2004 WL 96766.
247
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (deferring to
executive assertions about demands of national security); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-06 (1856) (holding that African Americans could not attain
national citizenship).
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court can undo the abuses inflicted in Guantanamo and elsewhere,
any more than the belated reparations offered to Japanese Americans
in 1988 could erase the internment camps. But this time, perhaps, it
will not take us nearly half a century to figure out that this is not who
we want to be.

